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Budgets are a prospective tool of governance, and appropriations are a planning vehicle 
reflecting: bureaucracies’ values, complex interactions, collective preferences, political 
influences, and available resources.  Research spanning 30 years finds that environmental 
pollution is a key determinant of environmental budgets in the US, though myriad factors, actors, 
and subsystems are important to consider.  Due to federalism and devolution of responsibilities 
and authorities, environmental governance falls largely to the states.  While the dynamics that 
shape state environmental budget policy have received scholarly interest, theoretically-driven 
examinations of environmental appropriations remain limited within the public budgeting and 
environmental policy literature.   
Using panel data from 2010 to 2015, this dissertation examines the legal, political, 
institutional, and fiscal factors that influence state own-source environmental funding drawing 
from several theories.  Given the key relationship between environmental pollution and 





conditioned on business interests from polluting sectors.  While the interaction effect holds 
across funding sources, the negative budgetary influence depends on the type of air pollution 
modeled.  Fiscal capacity is found to increase appropriations from state general funds but not 
appropriations from fees and other sources.  Mandatory climate policies have a positive influence 
on budgets, though the evidence is inconsistent between models.  Given cuts to federal 
environmental funding, flat trends in state funding, what factors influence the financing of 
environmental protection are of critical importance for civil society, practitioners, and public 
officials; therefore, this dissertation concludes with policy implications and avenues for future 

















Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background and Purpose 
State environmental agencies play a substantial role in US environmental governance—
tasked with environmental protection responsibilities and faced with challenging budgetary 
conditions (Environmental Council of the States [ECOS], 2010; 2017a; 2018; Rabe, 2007; 
Scheberle, 1997; Smith, Corvalán, & Kjellström, 1999).  Setting agency appropriations involves 
contextual factors, elected officials, public agency managers, interest groups, and the public at 
large, each of whom “have marked preferences about what government should and should not 
spend money on” (Rubin, 2010, p. 183).  This dissertation examines those budgetary 
determinants posited to influence appropriations to environmental agencies across the states.  
Despite over 40 years of research into myriad predictors of governments’ fiscal commitment to 
environmental protection, considerable gaps remain in state-level environmental public 
budgeting analysis hindering understanding of this complex public policy output (Aidt, 1998; 
Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Balint & Conant, 2013; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Lester & Bowman, 
1989; Lowry, 1992; Newmark & Witko, 2007; Sacco & Leduc, 1969).  As the spending 
instrument for environmental decision-making, state environmental budgets offer a portal into 
the contemporary health of environmental governance in the US—a governance that seeks to 
reconnect with citizens during the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of environmental 
policy through configurations of institutions, organizations, and laws (Durant, 2017; Kettl, 2000; 
Lee, Johnson, & Joyce, 2013).   
This study rests on a normative ideal—that increasing appropriations in response to 
pollution problems ought to be a core principle of environmental governance—however 





theoretical traditions, I will investigate whether state environmental agency budget policy is: 
responsive to environmental pollution; inured to business interests in polluting sectors and 
political partisanship; and positively influenced by: civic environmentalism, climate policies, 
fiscal capacity, and professionalism across state legislatures.  Despite mounting environmental 
problems, underfunding of environmental protection in the US is not a new phenomenon.  
Historically, environmental agency budgets have failed to keep pace with expanded 
responsibilities and ever-increasing state-level expectations particularly with respect to air 
quality (Scheberle, 1997; Woods & Potoski, 2010).  Examining the linkages between budgetary 
determinants and appropriations is salient given environmental budget reductions such as those 
proposed by the Trump administration while environmental protection responsibilities continue 
to accrue on state governments (Congressional Research Service, 2019; ECOS, 2012).   
Air pollution is the cause of nearly seven million deaths per year worldwide and is 
forecasted to increase due to proliferating megacities and further expansion of industrialization 
(Wang et al., 2016).  In the US alone, emissions from a single criteria air pollutant—particulate 
matter—account for over 100,000 to 200,000 premature deaths each year (Caiazzo, Ashok, 
Waitz, Yim, & Barrett, 2013; Goodkind, Tessum, Coggins, Hill, & Marshall, 2019).  Basu and 
Devaraj (2014) noted citizens are particularly “proactive about cleaning up the air they breathe” 
(p. 936) and air quality policy—in one form or another—has remained a fixture for governments 
and civil society (Chen, Shofer, Gokhale, & Kuschner, 2007).   
Air quality policy in the US involves a multitude of functions—(e.g. standard setting, 
monitoring, compliance and enforcement) (Rosenbaum, 2017), and of the environmental agency 
programs—(e.g. waste, water, remediation)—states play an outsized role in carrying out the 





from criteria air pollution—comprised of pollutants that provided the impetus for the Clean Air 
Act and greenhouse gas emissions, namely of carbon dioxide (CO2), that contribute to global 
climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018; Ringquist, 1993).   
This dissertation asks two questions:  
Research Question 1: Does the influence of air pollution on state environmental appropriations 
vary according to the magnitude of polluting business interests? 
Research Question 2: What are the effects of political, institutional, fiscal, and legal factors on 
state own-source appropriations to state environmental agencies and do the effects vary based on 
the funding source or air pollutant type? 
How this dissertation addresses each research question involves both theory and 
methodology.  Pertaining to theory, despite previous contributions of environmental budgets and 
spending—(e.g. Agthe, Billings, & Marchand, 1996; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Davis & Feiock, 
1992; Stanton & Whitehead, 1994)—much of the literature to-date has been atheoretical, and this 
gap in the academic literature is addressed in two ways.  First, I apply a theoretical framework to 
summarize factors that explain state environmental policy from a broad perspective (Schneider, 
2006).  Second, three individual theories are drawn upon to depict and establish the logical 
associations between the independent variables—(i.e. budgetary determinants)—and agency 
appropriations—(i.e. budgetary outputs)—in the empirical models (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003; 
Konisky & Woods, 2012; Lester, 1995).  Pertaining to methodology, I will examine the 
interaction of business interests and two types of air pollution on environmental agency budgets 
and the direct effects between the remaining political, institutional, fiscal, and legal factors on 





employ multiple methodological approaches to further extend this strand of public budgeting and 
environmental policy scholarship. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  First, I provide a summary of the 
theoretical framework and theories and how they are specifically applied.  Second, the 
conceptual model and research design and methodology is introduced followed by key variables 
and hypotheses.  To add context and underscore the importance of this study, historical state 
environmental budget trends and performance lapses are reviewed along with the terms and state 
agencies examined.  Lastly, several contributions are then summarized.   
1.2. Theoretical Foundations 
The integrated theory of state policymaking—(integrated theory)—is drawn upon to 
provide thematic coherence to the conceptual model by summarizing and isolating factors that 
influence state environmental public policy (Ringquist, 1994).  The integrated theory is rooted in 
three traditional theories of public policymaking: the economic model—socioeconomic factors 
are the primary drivers of state policy outputs; the political model—political variables drive state 
policymaking; and the group influence model—industrial groups or pluralist competition among 
groups drive state policymaking.  These original three sets of factors do not place emphasis on 
budgetary outcomes, thus required a minor digression to emphasize characteristics anticipated to 
be explanatory of fiscal policy outputs vice programmatic outputs—with the latter being 
Ringquist’s original focus.  Other differences in my framework include an emphasis on legal 
factors; focus on air quality; and inclusion of a political factor represented by partisan ideology.    
Synthesizing the integrated theory with literature from the public budgeting and 
environmental policy literature results in a framework with the four sets of factors depicted in 





based on the logic of representative governance: political—(e.g. citizen and partisan involvement 
and performance); institutional—(e.g. professionalization); fiscal—(e.g. fiscal health); and 
legal—(e.g. regulations and policies) (Bland, 2007; Lester & Lombard, 1990; Mikesell, 2018; 
Stanton & Whitehead, 1994).  Characteristics within these preceding contexts are viewed as 
determinants to budget policy—offering a perspective differing from budget policy analysis 
perceived through a stochastic lens (Rubin, 1989) given the latter’s limited utility in explicating 
public budgeting behavior (Smith & Bertozzi, 1998; Willoughby & Finn, 1996).   
Figure 1. 




Note. Inspired by Ringquist (1994)   
 
While the integrated theory serves as the framework, the three theories drawn upon to 
further specify the conceptual and empirical models include: technocracy theory, rational self-
interest theory, and ecological citizenship theory.  First, technocracy theory underscores a 
prominent function of environmental agency personnel in informing appropriations requests 
given their role in measuring, monitoring, and characterizing the magnitude and extent of 
pollution (Gunnel, 1982).  The theory explicates the motivation of technocratic personnel to be 





technical competence and instrumental rationality over partisan political influence and lobbying 
pressures from particularized—(e.g. business)—interests (Goodsell, 2014; Wilson, 1989).   
Technocracy theory focuses this analysis on the norms and values of contemporary 
regulatory environmental governance in the US—particularly how they are shaped by technical 
rationality applied to help translate “political issues into technically defined ends that can be 
pursued through administrative means” (Fischer & Forester, 1993, p. 22).  Though characterized 
as either a bureaupathology (Adams & Balfour, 2014; Arendt, 1971; Thompson, 1961), or a 
prerequisite necessary to achieve a “utopian social vision” (Goodsell, 2015; Gunnell, 1982, p. 
392; Taylor, 1967), technical rationality serves a prominent role in US bureaucracies.  I posit that 
environmental agencies function as technocracies attuned to environmental metrics, such as air 
pollution.  While critiques of scientific rationality in the context of environmental pollution are 
covered elsewhere—(e.g. Beck, 1992; Steinemann, 2000)—a responsive bureaucracy applies 
technical rationality to ensure fiscal resources requested are commensurate with pollution 
problems.  Technocracy theory informs the decision, for example, to evaluate the role of 
environmental pollution—and climate policies—as expected legal factors and budgetary 
determinants.   
Second, firm-level expenditures for environmental regulatory compliance are made by 
businesses, particularly in the polluting industrial sectors—(e.g. utilities, manufacturing, and 
mining) (Anderson, 2011; Falke, 2011).  Closely related to group theory (Dahl, 1961), rational 
self-interest theory (Olson, 1965) suggests that over time these “regulatory cost bearers” are 
cognizant of regulatory actions that impact their business operations and expenditures 
(Ringquist, 1993, p. 27).  In response, polluting business interests act to reduce environmental 





regulations that would create additional firm-level costs, particularly at the state level (Cline, 
2003; Williams & Matheny, 1984).   
Following Olson’s (1969) theoretical perspective, rational self-interest theory explains 
why business interests have influence in the public policy process.  In a study of environmental 
policy which drew on rational self-interest theory, Lyons (1999) found the “balance of group 
power will be relatively favorable to resource users and to industry” (p. 281).  This association is 
attributable to the political self-interest of elected public officials to respond favorably to specific 
business group constituencies who are themselves acting rationally by applying political 
pressure.  Rational self-interest theory is useful in explaining why the relationship between 
environmental pollution and environmental appropriations may be conditional upon business 
interests among the states.  Since the interaction of business interests and pollution on 
appropriations is a central focus of this dissertation, greater detail will be provided on this theory, 
and how it informs the hypothesized relationships, in the sections that follow.   
Lastly, ecological citizenship theory (Dobson, 2007) informs the linkage between citizen 
involvement through political participation—(i.e. civic environmentalism); inclusion of CO2 
emissions, and consideration of climate policies which require funding to implement (Abel & 
Stephan, 2000).  Ecological citizenship theory derives from the political science field and 
explains political activity through civic duties related to the environment that are incumbent 
upon individuals to achieve social equity (Jagers, Martinsson, & Matti, 2016).  Ecological 
citizenship theory includes an expansive spatial extent for environmental awareness and 
responsibility; it suggests that pro-environmental behavior is influenced not only by pollutants 
that are more spatially-delimited—(e.g. ground-level ozone, particulate matter)—but also 





feature of the theory supports the decision to include multiple indicators taking into account not 
only pollutants typically associated with more local and regional effects—(e.g. criteria air 
pollutants)—but also those categories of pollution that have profound impacts on the global 
community as well—CO2 emissions.  Ecological citizenship theory informs also the decision to 
evaluate civic environmentalism and climate policies as budgetary determinants.   
1.3. Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model in Figure 2 is consistent with previous perspectives of budget 
models (Bland, 2007; Mikesell, 2018; Schick, 1966) that recognize “states operate within 
political, economic, fiscal, and organizational contexts that, in turn, influence…[the] budget 
management exhibited” (Willoughby, 2008, p. 432).  The conceptual model that follows includes 
the following independent variables:  
 environmental pollution;  
 business interests (of polluting sectors);  
 civic environmentalism;  
 climate policies;  
 partisan ideology;  
 legislative professionalization;  
 fiscal capacity;  










Conceptual Model of Dissertation     
 
As depicted in the model, the dissertation conceptualizes annual appropriations to state 
environmental agencies as policy outputs, thus the empirical focus is on the policy attribute 
exogenous to the policy outcome following a policy stages heuristic (Lasswell, 1956; Lee et al., 
2013).  That is, this dissertation is not a study about environmental policy outcomes, agency 
performance, or the innovation and effectiveness of environmental bureaucracies or pollution 
control programs in the US—all topics addressed in previous scholarship and certain to garner 
on-going attention (Grant, Bergstrand, & Running, 2014; Heckman, 2012; Ringquist & Clark, 
2002; Sapat, 2004; Woods, Konisky, & Bowman, 2008).  Instead, the dependent variables 
consist of environmental agency budget policy.  This financial measure is drawn from the 
environmental policy and public budgeting literature and reflect what bureaucracies plan to do, 
or not do, based on past and current conditions.  Figure 3 represents the provision of government 










Provision of Government Services  
 
  
Note.  Adapted from Mikesell (2018). 
 
Though the linear diagram in Figure 3 represents a reality that is, in practice, more iterative and 
complex, it is offered at the outset to situate and convey the public policy output focus of this 
study.   
1.4. Research Design and Methodology 
This study uses a quantitative non-experimental research design to provide an exploratory 
empirical analysis of secondary data.  The hypotheses—provided below—are derived from the 
theoretical foundations—that is, this study uses a deductive rather than an inductive approach.  
As noted above, the analysis will include exploring the differential influence of criteria pollutant 
emissions and CO2 emissions on environmental budgets.  More specifically, while both air 
pollutant types are hypothesized to increase environmental appropriations, their influence could 
be unequal given the more recent regulation of CO2 emissions relative to those of criteria 
pollutants, and this will be empirically tested.  Additionally, the first dependent, or budgetary 






compliance user charges)—while the second consists of states’ general funds.  Despite these two 
components of state-level environmental appropriations, research attention has remained focused 
on either federal, or total state agency appropriations or on combined natural resource and 
environmental spending representing a gap in the scholarship.   
From a methodological perspective, the conceptual model provided in Figure 2 is 
analyzed, as detailed in Chapter 4, using a panel—(i.e. longitudinal)—structure with data for the 
nine variables—listed in the previous section—from 2010 to 2014, and those data are lagged one 
year and matched with state environmental agency appropriations from 2011 to 2015.  This 
methodological approach assesses the effects of factors in a given year on the environmental 
agency budget policy in the subsequent year for a national sample of states.  The analysis plan 
and research design includes econometric models specified by the environmental agency budget 



















Table 1.   
Study Variables 
Name Conceptualization Type of Variable 
Environmental (Air) 
Pollution   
Emissions to the ambient atmosphere from pollutants known to 
have local, regional, and global impacts (i.e. emissions of 
criteria pollutants and greenhouse gases—CO2).     
Legal 
Business Interests  
Prevalence of business collectivities (i.e. pressure groups / 
pressure participants) within the state as represented by major 





Construct that represents environmentally-focused concerns of 
the polis expressed by environmental constituencies and 
subconstituencies through electoral preferences. 
Political 
Climate Policies 
Represents the extent to which states have implemented 
mandatory policies to mitigate CO2 emissions. 
Legal 
Partisan Ideology 
The ideology of a state legislature based on partisan 
identification as reflected by the major political parties’ 








The capacity of a state to raise revenue to pay for governmental 




Budget-Fees & Other 
State Source Budgeted Funding (Fees & Other)-Fiscal Year 




State Source Budgeted Funding (General Fund)-Fiscal Year 
2011 through Fiscal Year 2015 
Fiscal 
 
Table 1 indicates also into what set of factors the variable fits within the conceptual model 
provided above in Figure 2.  While the classification of the majority of variables is intuitive, 
environmental pollution is viewed as a legal factor given that regulations and applicable legal 
requirements underpin air pollution abatement policy in the US.  The US Code, specifically set 
forth within 40 C.F.R. 64, Protection of the Environment, contains a multitude of legal 
requirements regulating the operating, monitoring, recordkeeping, reporting, notification, and 





Numerous studies indicate that state population and the flow of intergovernmental 
revenue sources (e.g. federal-source funding) can influence agency appropriations (e.g. Bacot & 
Dawes, 1996; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Gamkhar & Oates, 1996).  Thus, these two additional 
control variables—population and federal-source funding—are included within the models.  The 
two research questions and six hypotheses are provided in Table 2 as a prelude to Chapter 2 
which reviews the supporting academic literature.   
Table 2 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Questions Hypotheses 
Does the influence of air pollution on 
state environmental appropriations vary 
according to the magnitude of polluting 
business interests? 
H1: Air pollution severity will increase environmental 
agency budgets, if levels of polluting business interests of 
states are sufficiently low. 
What are the effects of political, 
institutional, fiscal, and legal factors on 
state own-source appropriations to state 
environmental agencies and do the effects 
vary based on the funding source or air 
pollutant type? 
H2: Civic environmentalism will have a positive influence on 
environmental agency budgets. 
H3: Mandatory climate policies will have a positive influence 
on environmental agency budgets. 
H4: Legislative professionalization will have a positive 
influence on environmental agency budgets. 
H5: Liberal ideology will have a positive influence on 
environmental agency budgets.  
H6: State fiscal capacity will have a positive influence on 
environmental agency budgets. 
 
Additional design and methodological details regarding limitations of this design for assessing 
causality as well as interpretation of coefficients; assessing heteroscedasticity; and serial—(i.e. 
autocorrelation)—are discussed within the statistical analysis plan in Chapter 3.     
1.5. State Environmental Budget Trends and Proportions 
Enhanced knowledge of environmental agency budgets can help public managers, and 
researchers, ascertain to what extent this policy output is: a “mechanism for setting goals and 





reflects public policymaking ideals (Nice, 2002).  While the preceding excerpts lay-out 
commonly held views from the public budgeting literature, they all give rise to a fundamental 
question.  Is it logical to propose agency administrators, legislators, and chief executives 
consider environmental pollution, business interests, and climate policies, for example, when 
legitimating appropriations bills?  To the extent that agency budget cost estimation involves 
attention to fulfilling a functional and coherent plan to address current and future environmental 
challenges, the answer ought to be a resounding yes!  Normatively, elected, and unelected public 
officials, observe the conditions including the perceived needs of their clientele; determine the 
intentions and required resources to deliver on those needs; and estimate the costs to supply what 
is believed to be necessary to meet organizational objectives (Mikesell, 2018).   
Despite the potential benefits of sufficiently-funded environmental agencies, state 
environmental budgets in the US have not kept pace with the challenges—not unlike budgetary 
trends besetting international environmental organizations and institutions (Axelrod & 
VanDeveer, 2017).  Therefore, importance for this study derives from the view that fiscal 
resources for environmental agencies in the US have long been inadequate (Lowry, 1992).  
Securing sufficient environmental budgets in competitive budgetary environments is a challenge 
particularly when considering the drastic cuts that beleaguer these agencies (Rabe, 2007) and for 
which the current federal executive branch administration has perennially proposed drastic cuts 
and historic reductions (LaRoss, 2017; Office of Management and Budget, 2018; 2019; 2020).   
Underscoring these challenges are the negligible proportions of total state expenditures 
dedicated to environmental protection.  For example, in 2015, environmental spending as a 
percent of the entire state budget hovered around 0.5% for Michigan and Virginia (Michigan, 





federal-level.  The following figure displays the enacted budget appropriations of USEPA; 
Department of Energy (DOE); Department of Education; the Department of Homeland Security 
(USDHS); and the Federal Highways Administration (FHWA) to illustrate the USEPA budgets 
between 2008 and 2015 relative to other federal agencies and departments. 
Figure 4. 
Budget Trends in Federal Agencies and Departments, 2008 - 2015 
 
Note.  Compiled by author from FHWA (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015); USDHS (2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016); U.S. Department of Education (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015); 
USDOE (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017); & USEPA (2017).  
 
The USEPA budgets depicted in Figure 4 are consistent with changes to the USEPA 
workforce resulting from an “EPA operating budget [that] was not much higher in the early years 
of the twenty-first century than it was in the 1980s” (Durant, 2017, p. 358).  An analysis of 
environmental budget data collected from the mid-2000s reveal that short-term trends in both 
federal and state-source funding to state environmental agencies have been either flat, or 
declining; however, reliable data for environmental agency budgets are difficult to obtain on a 





The Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) is a national non-profit organization 
that represents environmental agencies of states and territories of the US on matters ranging from 
coordination among the branches of state and federal governments to data collection efforts such 
as the projects ECOS funded to collect budget data to be used in this study (ECOS, 2017b).  As 
displayed in Figure 5, during the period from fiscal years 2009 extending through 2011, total 
budgets and environmental budgets derived from state-source revenues declined.  The federal-
source revenues, among the 25 states analyzed during the survey, remained flat.  This decline 
may be partially-attributable to either the financial crisis, which began in 2007, or it could be 
indicative of a prolonged downward trend (ECOS, 2010; Federal Reserve, 2016).  More 
specifically, these declining trends may have resulted from a neoliberal economic agenda that 
have “[hived] off their functions to private and nonprofit actors who presumably have the will 
and capacity” to protect the environment (Durant, 2017, p. 359).  Further, what little federal-
source dollars do flow to states are not for discretionary use but are either dedicated clean-up 
funds, or intended to resource specific grant programs (USEPA, 2018a).  Less than 40 percent of 
federal-source funds to state environmental agencies are unobligated (LaRoss, 2017).  Though 
informative, the 2010 ECOS survey analyzed to develop Figure 5 is nearly two decades old, and 











Figure 5.  
State Environmental Agency Budgets, 2009 - 2011 
 
Note.  Compiled by author from ECOS (2010) data. 
Figure 5 provides the state environmental agency budgets for the years reported 
separately as the: state-source; federal-source; and total—(i.e. combination of the state-source 
and federal-source) budgets.  These budget trends over this timeframe are brought into further 
focus when considered in the context of state spending on other government functions.  Figure 6 
provides the state environmental agency budget—broken-up by federal and state-source funding; 
percentage of funds spent on elementary and secondary education; percentage of funds spent on 
higher education; percentage spent on Medicaid; percentage spent on corrections; and percentage 
spent on transportation.  As the following figure reveals, state environmental budgets reflect a 






Figure 6.  
State Environmental Budgets as Proportions of Total State Expenditures, 2015 
 
Note.  Compiled by author from ECOS (2017b); National Association of State Budget Officers (2016).  Federal-
source funding of state environmental budgets is not discernable given its miniscule share of the total.   
 
1.6. State Environmental Budgets and Environmental Performance 
While the vigor of state environmental agency programs can be measured by policy 
outputs other than budgets—(e.g. enforcement actions, pollution reduction)—examples of 
inadequate environmental program strength and performance are often braided with observations 
of inadequate financing for environmental protection.  “Environmental program quality is 
directly related to spending” (Agthe et al., 1996, p. 29).  That is, environmental budgets shape 
the performance of state environmental agencies, thus identifying what factors determine 





Dawes, 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012; Lombard, 1993).  Furthermore, while previous studies—
(e.g. Lester, Franke, Bowman, & Kramer, 1983; Ringquist, 1993; Williams & Metheny, 1984)—
have analyzed the performance of specific environmental programs—(e.g. waste and water 
programs)—this dissertation diverges from these previous analyses by examining agency 
appropriations versus individual program budgets.   
The connection between budget policy antecedents and fiscal responsiveness holds is an 
important one given the challenges created by inadequate budgets, such as USEPA audits that 
revealed underperforming state agency performance outcomes in air quality (USEPA, 2016a).  
Though related to water quality not air quality, a salient example highlighting the connection 
between insufficient appropriations and environmental agency performance is the Flint, 
Michigan water crisis (Mettler, 2017).  As the Flint Water Advisory Task Force observed:  
Budgets for public health activities at federal, state, and local levels [are needed] 
to ensure that highly skilled personnel and adequate resources are available.  The 
consequences of underfunding include insufficient and inefficient responses to 
public health concerns, which have been evident in the Flint water crisis 
(Michigan, 2016, p. 4).   
Along a similar vein, Wood (1991) found that after the 1982 federal budget cuts, 
enforcement actions by the USEPA against Clean Air Act (CAA) violators abruptly decreased 
and once these funds were restored, enforcement activity rebounded with the states executing 
five times more enforcement actions than the USEPA.  In another study analyzing the effects of 
state environmental spending and enforcement, Konisky (2009) found that states which increased 
spending on the environment experienced higher rates of enforcement of their environmental 





environmental agencies were so adversely impacted, they did not execute the functions delegated 
by the USEPA (Lester, 1986).   
The findings demonstrate that when state environmental agencies encounter downward 
fiscal pressures, the capacity to perform their delegated duties is hollowed-out; this leads to 
lapses such as inadequate compliance oversight.  For example, 81 percent fewer environmental 
enforcement cases were brought in Florida in 2015 than in 2010, with the lowest fines since 1988 
(Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, 2015).  A review of USEPA’s compliance 
and enforcement tracking system suggests this decline in enforcement is not attributable to a 
more compliant regulated community.  USEPA’s on-line enforcement and compliance history 
reporting website recently listed 8,400 facilities with significant violations which includes 2,000 
instances of significant violations of the CAA (USEPA, 2016b).  These facilities have air 
emissions that cause injury and premature death particularly in states that have grown 
increasingly dependent upon petrochemical and oil and gas industries—(e.g. Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Louisiana).  Notably, these are all states identified as having slashed 
their environmental budgets in recent years (Environmental Integrity Project, 2019).   
1.7. Definitions of Terms 
 Most terms are included throughout the dissertation in the context of their operational 
definitions; therefore, this section includes only a brief background of three terms used 
frequently throughout.  While this section provides definitions, operationalization is included in 
Chapter 3, methodology.    
Civic environmentalism represents the environmentally-focused concerns expressed by 
environmental constituencies and subconstituencies as reflected by their voting preferences of 





coordinate to enhance environmental outcomes, such as improving air quality or planning and 
building sustainable communities (Agyeman & Angus, 2003; Knopman, Susman, & Landy, 
1999).  It has historically been the case that civil society expresses environmental demands 
through electoral preferences.  For example, environmental group membership has been found to 
positively influence pro-environmental voting behavior of members of Congress (Anderson, 
2011).   
Polluting business interests can be defined in several ways.  Fundamental to the notion of 
business interests, however, is the idea of a collectivity—(i.e. “a pressure group”)—whose 
existence is rooted in a commonality of purpose and the wherewithal to promote and advance 
efforts, through the political process, that materially affect policy outputs and outcomes that 
maximize their utility (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999, p. 204).  Though there is ambiguity in the 
conceptualization of this term in the social sciences, for the purposes of this study, business 
interests—which will be the shorthand oftentimes applied for this variable throughout—refers to 
larger non-formal organizations rather than individual membership bodies.  Business interests act 
with uniformity, through collective action and determine ways to effectively lobby policy 
makers, or bureaucracies, so as to benefit their constituent members (Olson, 1965).  In this 
dissertation, business interests refer to the prevalence of business collectivities within the state as 
represented by major polluting sectors of states’ economies—(e.g. utilities, manufacturing, and 
mining) (Anderson, 2011; Falke, 2011).   
Lastly, environmental agency budget policy refers to the overall purposive courses of 
action that groups of policy makers and stakeholders make, or choose not to make, on some 
consistent and reliable recurring basis, to be responsive to an environmental public problem or 





conceptualization is drawn from Heclo’s (1972) definition of public policy and is synthesized 
from previous scholars (Dye, 2006; Friedrich, 1963; Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950).  The term, 
environmental agency budget policy is used in this dissertation to concurrently reflect the 
multiple fiscal components that exist in the ECOS (2017b) dataset which will be used for this 
study.  This terminology derives also from the theoretical framework which is focused on state 
policy outputs, hence addition of the term “policy” to the phrase “environmental agency budget.”  
This manner of describing of environmental budgets as a policy output is useful for theoretical 
and narrative purposes and extends from previous research that employs similar terminology 
(Bacot & Dawes, 1996).   
1.8. State Environmental Agencies 
Analyzing policy at the state agency level derives from the enormous roles these 
bureaucracies serve in US environmental governance and the need to reconceptualize their 
purpose and impact on public policy in addressing domestic and global pollution challenges 
(Durant et al., 2017).  The unit of analysis for this study is the state environmental agency 
budget, and this section provides an overview of the agency structure and functions.   
Many state environmental agencies are organized similar to the USEPA—by 
environmental media (e.g. air, water); function (e.g. compliance, enforcement, research & 
development); and geography (e.g. regions, regional offices) (Sinclair & Whitford, 2012).  State 
environmental funds support compliance and enforcement efforts; air quality monitoring; 
research and development; projects to safeguard clean water and clean-up bays and estuaries, 
environmental justice and education; and compliance support to the regulated community 
including environmental restoration of contaminated sites for redevelopment.  While some state 





many are stand-alone organizations situated within the state’s secretariat of natural resources or 
the equivalent (e.g., Virginia).  Most states have interrelated functions that pertain to human 
health and the environment split between several agency types which may include a department 
of health; department of natural resources; department of conservation; game and fish 
department; and a department of environmental quality or management.  Due to the various 
institutional organizational structures and core missions, research in this area of public policy 
requires the identification of the agency whose budget is being analyzed.  The following table 





















State Environmental Agencies 
 
State Agency Name State  Agency Name 
Alabama Department of Environmental 
Management (DEM) 
Montana DEQ 
Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation (DEC) 
Nebraska DEQ 
Arizona Department of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ) 
Nevada DEP 
Arkansas DEQ New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services 
California Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) New Jersey DEP 
Colorado Department of Public Health and 
Environment 
New Mexico Environment Department 
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP) 
New York DEC 
Delaware Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Control 
North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources 
Florida DEP North Dakota Department of Health-Environmental 
Health Section 
Georgia Environmental Protection Division Ohio EPA 
Hawaii Department of Health Oklahoma DEQ 
Idaho DEQ Oregon DEQ 
Illinois EPA Pennsylvania DEP 
Indiana DEM Rhode Island DEM 
Iowa Department of Health South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control 
Kansas Department of Health and Environment South Dakota Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources 
Kentucky DEP Tennessee DEC 
Louisiana DEQ Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 
Maine DEP Utah DEQ 
Maryland Department of the Environment Vermont DEC 
Massachusetts DEP Virginia DEQ 
Michigan DEQ Washington Department of Ecology 
Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) West Virginia  DEP 
Mississippi DEQ Wisconsin DNR 
Missouri DNR Wyoming DEQ 
  D.C. Department of Energy and Environment 
 
Though ultimately environmental agencies develop media—(e.g. water, air, land)—based 
programs to address environmental pollution (Sapat, 2004), differentiations in their structures are 
driven by the extent to which the state decides to combine, or separate, public health and 
environmental functions.  Within this literature regarding the structure of state environmental 
agencies, there is broad consensus that the organizational structural designs can fit into three 
groups: 1) a health department model including expenditures on healthcare unrelated to 





resource oversight and management functions (Gale, 1986); and 3) mini-USEPA structures that 
“emulate their federal counterpart”—(i.e. organized by environmental media and function). 
(Bacot & Dawes, 1997, p. 358; Burke, Tran, & Shalauta, 1995).    
Previous literature reveals that roughly 90% of environmental protection efforts are 
executed within the environmental agencies versus health departments (Gordon, 1998) with 
public health expenditures representing a negligible percentage of spending to promote 
environmental health (Burke et al., 1995; Sinclair & Whitford, 2012).  In a comprehensive study 
of various determinants of state environmental performance rankings, organizational structure of 
the agency (i.e. mini-USEPA versus superagency), the structure was not found to be a 
statistically significant factor in the analysis (Bacot & Dawes, 1997).  The extant research on 
environmental agency structure, functions, and expenditures was drawn upon to inform the 
decision to focus the analysis on the budgets of agencies listed in Table 3.   
1.9. Contributions of this Dissertation 
This dissertation offers four contributions.  First, this study contributes to the theoretical 
foundations with the integrated theory of state policymaking as the theoretical framework and 
drawing upon technocracy theory, rational self-interest theory, and ecological citizenship theory 
to further specify the conceptual and empirical models.  Despite previous research contributions 
(e.g. Stanton & Whitehead, 1994), there is a need for expanding the application of theory in 
agency budgeting scholarship related to environmental policy (Rubin, 1989; Ryu, Bowling, Cho 
& Wright, 2008).  This observation is shared by state environmental policy scholars (Lester & 
Lombard, 1990)—that research on environmental policy outputs requires consideration of more 
than a single theoretical perspective and ought to move beyond a systems framework as the 





theory of state policymaking framework have been used to examine environmental policies (e.g. 
Kim & Verweij, 2016; Ringquist & Clark, 2002; Vachon & Menz, 2006), this dissertation marks 
its first application to environmental agency budgets. 
Second, in the case of state environmental agencies, intergovernmental financing occurs 
via two sources: the main one, originating from the state government (i.e. state-source), and 
another from the national government (i.e. federal-source).  By disaggregating total state 
environmental appropriations into the two sources of state own-source funding, I contribute to 
the literature by exploring the differential effects of the same set of determinants on two separate 
sources of appropriations while controlling for the effects of federal-source funding.  More 
specifically, while examining general fund appropriations can reveal the influence of budgetary 
determinants on the overall budgeting process, separately modeling fees and other sources allows 
for an investigation into the contributing factors of this growing revenue structure.  Despite prior 
research suggesting federal and state policy, within the same functional areas of governance, 
have different antecedents (Clark & Whitford, 2011), the environmental budget policy measure 
with resonance in the literature consists of the total fiscal resources appropriated to state 
environmental agencies (Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012).  This focus persists 
despite state governments increasingly relying upon general funds and user charges drawn from 
the regulated community—the two sources of state own-source funding.  In the face of 
continuing cuts to federal revenues, state-source funding now exceeds three-quarters of state 
agency budgets making it the focus of this dissertation (ECOS, 2018).   
Third, this dissertation contributes by focusing on whether the effect of environmental 
pollution on environmental appropriations is conditioned by—i.e. interacts with—business 





move beyond analyzing bivariate relationships and regression coefficients interpreted as only 
direct effects (Lester & Lombard, 1990).  As observed by Willoughby and Finn (1996), the 
public budgeting process involves the “interaction of numerous players”, and these stakeholders 
have varying allegiances and values that can condition this complex process (p. 524).   
  Fourth, this dissertation offers a methodological contribution to increase the construct 
validity by examining the effects of air pollutant emissions in two ways.  First, I examine the 
influence of six criteria pollutants to move beyond single indicator measures (Bacot & Dawes, 
1996, 1997) which, while useful, do not include the broad array of pollutants regulated under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA).  Second, the effect of CO2 emissions on environmental agency budgets is 
separately assessed given the evolving focus of environmental governance in the US on climate 
policy (Martin & Saikawa, 2017).   
1.10. Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the theoretical foundations, prior environmental 
policy and budgeting research supporting each hypothesis before moving onto describe the 
essential role of federalism in US environmental governance.  Chapter 3 picks-up with the 
research design and methodology and includes the statistical analysis plan before turning to the 
empirical findings—and limitations—in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 includes the summary and 









Chapter 2: Theory & Literature Review 
Chapter 2 is organized as follows.  The preliminary sections of this chapter provide an 
expanded discussion of the theoretical framework and perspectives.  This is followed by the 
literature supporting environmental budget analysis including the six strands of scholarship 
organized by each hypotheses and the supporting academic literature.  Existing knowledge gaps 
are then discussed.  The last section of the chapter describes the essential role of federalism in 
US environmental governance to further establish the level, and unit, of analysis.   
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
Environmental policy efforts reflect “divergent social, political, economic, and 
environmental conditions across the country” (Durant et al., 2017, p. xi).  To achieve 
environmental outcomes citizens demands of civil society, such as clean air, Abramson, Breul, 
and Kamensky (2007) observed policy implementation requires governmental institutions to add 
legitimacy; provide the regulatory authority; and to allocate the necessary resources.  That is, 
environmental governance involves “actors from a variety of public and private organizations 
who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue such as air pollution control” 
(Fishkin, 1991; Hajer, 1993; Sabatier, 1988, p.131).  Budget policy preparation, especially on 
technical issues such as air pollution, involve collaboration between legislators, agency officials, 
special interest groups, and other actors involved in policy formulation and implementation 
similar to the perspectives in collaborative governance theory (Ansell & Gash, 2008) and the 
advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988).   
Theoretical frameworks in the social sciences often help produce conceptual models to 
help identify factors thought to explain a social phenomenon from a broad perspective 





summarize and isolate the factors to explain environmental agency budgetary phenomenon from 
a broad perspective (Schneider, 2006).   
While acknowledging the progression of theoretical advancements in state policy theory 
(e.g. Dye, 1966; Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1989), Ringquist (1994) advanced the integrated 
theory in response to previous critiques over state policymaking theories which fell short of 
offering a comprehensive view of political and fiscal influences.  The framework, rooted in 
environmental public policy, was developed to validate theories across several policy domains 
and proposes that state policy strength (i.e. responsiveness) can be explicated by actors and 
institutions within the political system.  The resulting framework holds that responsiveness of 
state governments can be explained by political, institutional, legal, and fiscal factors.  The 
theory was used by Ringquist and Clark (2002) to guide their study on environmental justice 
which assessed state policymaking based on external and internal factors drawing on “consistent 
findings from thirty years of state politics research” (p. 363).  While conceptual models derived 
from the integrated theory have been used to explain policy matters in other environmental 
policy research (e.g. Kim & Verweij, 2016; Ringquist & Clark, 2002; Vachon & Menz, 2006), 
this is the first study to apply it to environmental agency budgeting.   
The framework is based on varying sociological conceptions including that of the 
outcome variable—environmental agency budget policy—at the organizational level (i.e. meso-
level) (Neuman, 2009).  Since the level of analysis—“the unit to which the data are assigned for 
hypothesis testing and statistical analysis” (Rousseau, 1985, p. 4)—is at the state-level, the 
theoretical perspective is focused at the macro level—aimed at analyzing state environmental 
policy from a largely institutional perspective.  In addition to its application to environmental 





declared essential to public policy and administration analyses.  In particular, Roberts (2008) 
argued that frameworks drawn upon to help explain macro-level policy outputs ought to include 
a broad range of factors including economic, political, and social.   
Before turning to the individual theories, there are four details regarding the framework 
that merit attention.  First, the integrated theory is rooted in political science and based on three 
sets of factors—economic-ideological; organized interests-pressures; and political systems 
characteristics—my framework provides a thematic inventory including four sets of factors 
drawing upon multiple disciplines particularly public budgeting.  The original three sets of 
factors do not place emphasis on fiscal factors and required a minor digression to emphasize 
characteristics anticipated to be explanatory of fiscal policy outputs.  Second, the original 
framework focused on environmental policy in the context of water quality and hazardous waste 
management whereas my study focuses on air quality.  Therefore, a minor rework included a 
legal factor to provide a logical inventory for two variables—climate policies and environmental 
pollution from CO2 emissions.   
Third, where the original model described environmental pollution as an organized 
interest / pressure variable based on single measures of environmental pollution, this dissertation 
includes this variable as a legal factor using a composite measure—for criteria pollutant 
emissions and an individual indicator—CO2—for GHG emissions.  Lastly, while the original 
model included a variable—state opinion liberalism, as a type of economic-ideological variable, 
the adapted framework includes state partisan ideology as a political factor as it relates to elected 






While the extant literature offers methodological contributions relevant to environmental 
budgets, it offers comparatively less in theory application and testing specific to environmental 
policy—representing a wide gap in the literature recognized by previous academic scholarship 
(Lester & Lombard, 1990).  As mentioned in Chapter 1, three additional theories are drawn upon 
to help establish the hypothesized associations between specific independent variables—
budgetary determinants—and environmental budget policy.  Further, as noted by Stanton & 
Whitehead (1994), this approach helps address model misspecification on account of omitted 
variables.  Thus, Gunnell’s (1982) technocracy theory, Olson’s (1969) theoretical perspective on 
rational self-interest, and Dobson’s (2007) ecological citizenship theory are drawn from to 
analyze, explicate, and provide a logical accounting of the relationships between key study 
variables, thus helping to establish hypotheses tested by the empirical models (Jaccard & Turrisi, 
2003).  The following sections describe each theory before turning to a summary of the 
theoretical, empirical, and methodological details justifying examination of each variable and 
hypothesis.   
2.2.1. Technocracy theory. 
 The term, technocracy, was used in the US first within the engineering field in the early-
1900s; however, it can be traced back to the 1800s to early theorists of rational planning and 
social order including Henri de Saint-Simon (Gunnell, 1982).  The theory refers to the influence 
that technical personnel (e.g. scientists, engineers) have on society, and it is defined as the “the 
exercise of political authority by virtue of technical competence and expertise in the application 
of knowledge” (Gunnell, 1982, p. 392).  Technocracy theory is a variant of the conflict theory 





context of the hegemony that bureaucratic elites demonstrated throughout World War II (Barratt, 
2011) and beyond (Goodsell, 2015; Sunstein, 2015).   
Dye and Zeigler (1970) observed that elites play a prominent role in public policy 
through a mutual-benefit association that regards the public’s concerns.  A technocratic tenor in 
public policy making is also evidenced in the writings of Key (1967) who observed that mature 
democracies translate the needs of the governed into policies that address these needs.  
Technocracy in the US plays a meaningful role in public policy given the complexity of the 
society and relative lack of domain knowledge civil society has compared to the bureaucracy 
across a wide range of technically intricate government functions.  Fiorina observed that “as 
ordinary citizens we do not know the proper rate of growth of the money supply, the appropriate 
level of the federal deficit, the advantages of the [missile eXperimental] MX over alternative 
missile systems, and so forth” arguing that the role of understanding and making policy sense out 
of sometimes disparate information is delegated to policymakers—both elected and as non-
elected bureaucrats (1980, p. 26).   
In addition to the inherent complexity of governance, the move towards professionalized 
bureaucracies was to answer the challenge in public administration in the nineteenth century.  
These agencies were needed to “replace partisan patronage and machine politics” (Goodsell, 
2015, p.182).  Environmental agencies function as technocracies—structured with programs that 
have specific goals and performance standards which are based on environmental metrics, such 
as pollution severity.  As Stone (2014) observes, “Policy makers need clear thresholds to set 
program goals, define eligibility, and measure performance…[they] emphasize the measurable” 
(p. 94).  This observation is similar to Wilson’s who noted how government agencies often focus 





Technocracy theory suggests that environmental agency personnel characterize the 
magnitude, and type, of pollution which is conveyed to the appropriate members of their 
organization who pass the budgetary requests to their funding sources as either a nudge, or 
technocratic requests for more funding based on the magnitude of pollution severity.  A 
normative premise of this dissertation is that increased funding results from environmental 
agencies’ empirical knowledge of air pollution—facilitated by their collection and analysis of 
pollutant data—and consequent brokering of that information during the budget process.  As 
applied to my study, technocracy theory holds that states increase environmental appropriations 
in response to air pollution to fund the necessary permitting, compliance, and enforcement 
programs requested by the environmental agency to address pollution.   
This theory also holds that climate policy adoption will have a positive influence on 
budgets, since additional technical personnel are needed to develop and implement the necessary 
programs to achieve the policy goals of CO2 mitigation.  This anticipated relationship between 
pollution and climate policies to environmental appropriations is rooted in a theory of social 
science that reinforces “public officials who can use scientific information, design optimal 
policies and achieve planned outcomes” to justify demanding responsiveness in the form of 
appropriations (Agyeman & Angus, 2003, p. 351).    
While the environmental technocracy applies technical means to make the rationales and 
repercussions on inaction more detailed and better explained during the budget process, their 
input is necessary but not sufficient to address wicked problems.  Rittel and Webber (1973) 
called into question the ability for so-called experts or political elites to solve certain societal 





interests, and multiple stakeholders including the ecological concerns articulated by civil society 
(Weible, Sabatier, & Lubell, 2004).   
 2.2.2. Rational self-interest theory.   
Rational self-interest theory goes to the core of addressing the so-called “second 
question” relevant to public policy and administration—for whom is environmental governance 
working (i.e. civil society or business interests?) (Frederickson, 2005).  Following Olson’s 
(1965) seminal work, Lyons (1999) explicated the behavior and motivations of business interest 
groups through rational self-interest theory derived from the economics literature and closely 
related to the market-based social choice by collectives—or public choice—theoretical 
perspective (Buchanan, 1954).  Following this theory, where other interests may essentially fail 
at achieving unity, cohesive messaging, and ultimate impact on policies, business interests 
demonstrate aptitude particularly when the group’s focus is trained at policies that have localized 
and specific interests.  Lyons (1999) adds that that the “balance of group power will be relatively 
favorable to resource users and to industry” (p. 281).  This, in-turn, engenders a responsive 
legislative, and bureaucratic, orientation that attends to the demands of business interests which 
ultimately impedes what would otherwise be increasing budgets in response to pollution.       
Rational self-interest theory informs my decision to examine the interaction effect 
between business interests and environmental pollution on environmental agency appropriations 
rather than analyzing for unconditional effects.  Drawing from rational self-interest theory, 
business and industrial communities maintain awareness of environmental policy developments 
which could impact their business operations.  Such developments might include a state 





bolster compliance and enforcement efforts, either of which could impact (i.e. increase) firm-
level capital and operating expenses.   
It follows, logically, and has been examined empirically (e.g. Newmark & Witko, 2007) 
that as levels of specialized interests are greater in a state, the more intense is the filtering of 
pollution severity information throughout the budgetary process.  With business interests, this 
process involves pressure to stymie appropriations for environmental protection.  Taken together, 
per technocracy theory, state governments ought to appropriate more in response to pollution; 
however, per rational self-interest theory, fiscal responsiveness may be evident only when 
business interests conditions are sufficiently accommodative (i.e. low).   
2.2.3. Ecological citizenship theory. 
Ecological citizenship theory suggests civic environmentalism is not limited to individual 
environmentally-friendly behaviors though these have clear importance (e.g. recycling behavior 
or “green” transportation preferences), but the concept extends to the political arena where civil 
society has an opportunity to positively influence environmental policy outputs (Jagers et al., 
2016).  Thus, ecological citizenship acts at the level of political institutions.  Accordingly, 
environmental citizenship can be conceptualized as an interest in domestic legislative efforts to 
address domestic and global environmental challenges of which there has been an increased 
tempo in the US.  One example is the rise in legislation since the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Massachusetts v. United States Environmental Protection Agency (2007) which “accelerated a 
cascade of climate-warming bills, resolutions, and amendments already emerging from 
Congress” with proposals doubling between 2007 and 2008, alone (Rosenbaum, 2017, p. 370).   
Though there is ambiguity over the term environmental citizenship, Dobson (2007) 





democratic and decision-making structures (e.g. elected bodies) that may be reproducing 
environmental injustices pointing-towards an underlying connection between environmental 
citizenship and political—electoral—preferences.  Stern (2000) differentiated this type of 
electoral-based environmental citizenship from environmental behavior expressed through 
environmental organization participation (i.e. environmental activism) noting empirical evidence 
that the former may lead to comparatively larger societal effects, because “public policies can 
change the behaviors of many people and organizations at once” (p. 410).  While Stern, Dietz, 
Abel, Guagnano, and Kalof (1999) were advancing a separate theory termed the value-belief-
norm theory, that contemplates a more expansive consideration of related concepts such as 
personal norms and belief systems, ecological citizenship theory can be thought of as a 
derivation of the value-belief-norm theory.    
Ecological citizenship theory emerged from the political science literature explaining 
political activity through the relationship between citizens and the state and posits that civic 
duties are incumbent upon individuals, related to the environment, and these obligations must be 
fulfilled in order to promote social justice and equity (Jagers et al., 2016).  Ecological citizenship 
thus enables the hypothetical expectation of an empirical linkage between civic 
environmentalism—and climate policies—and environmental agency budgets.   
This theory also suggests that pro-environmental behavior is influenced not only by 
criteria pollutant emissions to ambient air, but also by GHGs (i.e. those pollutants that have both 
local and global impacts) (Dobson, 2007).  Accordingly, the civil ecological perspective informs 
a methodological decision to conceptualize and operationalize pollution severity based upon 
indicators that encompass several classes of pollutants thus addressing a gap in environmental 





2.3. Literature Review 
A review of the environmental policy literature reveals the shifting of environmental 
protection responsibilities from the national government to the states which helped stoke 
research interest in state environmental agency policy particularly in the 1980s—(Crotty, 1987; 
Davis & Lester, 1987; Lester et al., 1983; Lester & Bowman, 1989; Williams & Metheny, 1984; 
Rabe, 2007).  Subsequent to this shift, the study of environmental budgets and spending 
proliferated in the public policy and environmental literature throughout the 1990s—(Agthe et 
al., 1996; Bacot & Dawes, 1996; 1997; Davis & Feiock, 1992; Hays, Esler, & Hays, 1996; 
Lester, 1995; Lester & Lombard, 1990; Ringquist, 1993; 1994; 1995).  A more recent strand of 
scholarship focuses on the impacts of Clean Air Act pollutants on local jurisdiction revenues 
(Carr, 2011a); expenditure patterns in response to increased federal regulations (Carr, 2011b); 
and the impact of environmental regulations on subnational governments’ economic performance 
(Yan & Carr, 2013).  These preceding studies hi-light the theoretical and empirical linkages 
between environmental (e.g. air pollution) and subnational public budgeting providing a 
foundation upon which this study builds.   
Many of the early environmental agency scholarship focused on either national and 
subnational government dynamics in particular (e.g. environmental federalism) (Crotty, 1987), or 
on specific programs within environmental agencies, such as air and water quality (Lombard, 
1993; Stanton & Whitehead, 1994) or hazardous waste (Lester et al., 1983).  While there was 
heightened academic literature on environmental budget policy, the literature was followed-up 
by only a dearth of related scholarship at the state-level (e.g. Clark & Whitford, 2011; Konisky 
& Woods, 2012; Newmark & Witko, 2008).  Table 4 summarizes key literature along with the 














Theoretical: Technocracy Theory 
Empirical: Previous Findings Support Inclusion 
Key Literature: Agthe et al. (1996); Bacot & Dawes (1996); Martin & 
Saikawa (2017) 
Environmental pollution is the focal 
independent variable—see H6 for hypotheses 
involving the interaction effects. 
Business Interests Political 
Theoretical: Rational Self Interest Theory 
Empirical: Unstudied with Interaction of Pollution on State Own-source 
Environmental Budgets 
Key Literature: Buchanan & Tullock (1999); Jordan, Halpin, & Maloney 
(2004); Newmark & Witko, (2007) 
H1: Air pollution severity will increase state 
environmental agency budgets, if levels of 





Theoretical: Ecological Citizenship Theory 
Empirical: Understudied Despite Previous Findings Suggesting Related 
Constructs are a Determinant 
Key Literature: Dewitt (2006); Knopman et al. (1999); Konisky & 
Woods (2012) 
H2: Civic environmentalism will have a 
positive influence on state environmental 
agency budgets. 
Climate Policies Legal 
Theoretical: Technocracy Theory & Ecological Citizenship Theory  
Empirical: Unstudied in Context of State Environmental Agency Budgets 
Key Literature: Grant et al. (2014); Rabe (2007) 
H3: Mandatory climate policies will result in 




Empirical Findings: Previous Findings Support Inclusion  
Key Literature: Mooney (1995); Konisky & Woods (2012); Squire 
(2012; 2017) 
H4: Legislative professionalization will have 
a positive influence on state environmental 
budgets. 
Partisan Ideology Political 
Empirical: Previous Findings Support Inclusion 
Key Literature: Alt & Lowry (2000); Anderson (2011); Clark & 
Whitford (2011); Fowler & Breen (2013) 
H5: Liberal ideology will have a positive 




Empirical: Unstudied in Context of State Environmental Agency Budgets 
with Indicator Used (TTR) 
Key Literature: Agthe et al. (1996); Bacot & Dawes (1996); Hays et al. 
(1996)  
H6: State fiscal capacity will have a positive 





2.3.1. Literature emphasizing environmental budgets. 
While several approaches are available to assess the strength of environmental public 
policy at the state level (e.g. pollution outcomes, enforcement actions, quantity of delegated 
programs from USEPA), a branch of scholarship emphasizes budgetary output analysis over 
alternative metrics (Agthe et al., 1996; Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Kraft & Vig, 2013).  For example, 
Balint and Conant (2013) conceptualized agency operating budgets as the “principal indicator of 
the agency’s vitality and influence” (p. 23).  In explaining the linkage between environmental 
pollution and budgets, Patten (1998) suggested environmental problems inevitably lead to 
deliberation on increasing expenditure levels.   
While Lester and Lombard (1990) cautioned researchers against interpreting budgets as 
interchangeable with state environmental agency performance, analysis of environmental agency 
financial indicators has resonance in state environmental policy research.  These economic-based 
measures provide a way to capture “a state’s commitment to environmental protection” (Clark & 
Whitford, 2011; Konisky & Woods, 2012, p. 545).  Bacot and Dawes (1997) observed “since 
legislative and programmatic goals are only as effective as their funding levels permit them to 
be, it appears that the expenditure approach may be the most suitable method for estimating 
states’ environmental efforts” versus empirically assessing related concepts (p. 366).  Previous 
research reveals that investigating agency budget policy versus state political and administrative 
rankings offers a robust approach and reflects environmental agency effort (Bacot & Dawes, 
1997; Woods et al., 2008).  “We can be confident that a state's real environmental effort is being 





2.3.2. Factors that influence environmental agency budget policy. 
Throughout the years, studies find associations between the factors within the integrated 
theory (i.e. political, institutional, legal, and fiscal) and environmental financial measures (e.g. 
appropriations and expenditures).  The next sections provide brief reviews of six strands of 
literature; identification of gaps in the scholarship that this dissertation helps fill; and expands 
upon the hypotheses.  This chapter concludes with a discussion of environmental federalism that 
situates the state-level of analysis in this dissertation.     
2.3.2.1. Air pollution and business interests influencing budgets.  
Air pollution is an externality—that is, it “arises when a person [or firm] engages in an 
activity that influences the well-being of a bystander but neither pays nor receives compensation 
for that effect”, since it remains outside—or external to—the underlying transaction (Mankiw, 
2015, p. 196).  Negative externalities, such as air pollution, involve legal instruments (e.g. 
regulations) aimed at reducing (i.e. mitigating) emissions which is the case with air pollution 
abatement in the US, and these programs carry production and governance costs.  Further, state 
environmental agencies have exercised ever-increasing autonomy and efforts to curb air 
pollution over the past several decades (Chubb, 1985; Crotty, 1987; Goulder & Stavins, 2011).  
As Basu and Devaraj (2014, p. 936) noted, society is “more proactive about cleaning up the air 
they breathe” due to the disproportionate negative impacts on children and elderly populations 
and transboundary nature of air pollution spillover effects (Woods & Potoski, 2010).   
Environmental governance in the US has traditionally been achieved through the 
promulgation of regulations based on quantitative standards derived from toxicity and risk 
assessment information.  In the US “the best example is the National Ambient Air Quality 





population with an adequate margin of safety” (Fiorino, 2017, p. 316; Johnson & Graham, 2005).  
The USEPA establishes these national ambient air quality standards (NAAQs) for the following 
six air pollutants termed criteria air pollutants, since the NAAQS are established on health-
based criteria (Al-Kohlani & Campbell, 2016; Martineau & Novello, 2004; Simon, Reff, Wells, 
Xing, & Frank (2015); 40 CFR, Part 50: Nitrogen Oxides (NOx); Sulfur Oxides (SOx); Carbon 
Monoxide (CO); Particulate Matter (PM) as PM10 and PM2.5; Ozone (O3); and Lead (Pb).   
Table 5 provides a summary of the known, and suspected, human health effects due to exposure 
to criteria pollutants.  Although it is a highly toxic heavy metal—especially to children—lead is 
excluded from Table 5, since lead emissions will not be empirically assessed within this study 
due to its comparatively minute contribution to overall criteria pollutant emissions after its 





















Criteria Air Pollutants and Known Human Health Effects 
Pollutant Description Health Effects 
Nitrogen 
Oxides (NOx) 
NOx are gaseous pollutants emitted as NO 
and react in the atmosphere to form nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2); the primary source of NOx 
are combustion sources (e.g. power plants 
and automobiles).  NOx are ozone precursors. 
Exposure to NOx has been associated with 
bronchoconstriction and respiratory infections 
especially in people with asthma via systemic 
inflammation oxidative stress pathways 
(Chauhan, Krishna, Frew, & Holgate, 1998; 
Kagawa, 1985; Kampa & Castanas, 2008; 
Peel, Haeuber, Garcia, Russell, Neas, 2013) 
Sulfur Oxides 
(SOx) 
SOx are gaseous pollutants for which the 
primary anthropogenic source is also 
combustion of fossil fuels.   
SOx exposure has been associated with 
reduced fetal growth; bronchospasms; acute 
myocardial infarctions (Hansen, Barnett, & 
Pritchard, 2008; Kermani, Jokandan, Aghaei, 
Asl, Karimzadeh, & Dowlati, 2016) 
Carbon 
Monoxide (CO) 
CO is a gaseous pollutant that is formed as a 
byproduct of incomplete combustion.   
CO exposure has been linked to 
cardiovascular effects including impaired 
mental activity; impaired neural development 
in children (Badman & Jaffe, 1996; Levy, 
2016).  
Particulate 
Matter (PM) as 
PM10 and PM2.5 
PM is a mixture of particles that are 
suspended in ambient air produced by a 
variety of activities including combustion of 
fuel and construction activity.  PM10 has an 
aerodynamic diameter of ≤ 10 microns, and 
is also known as particulate matter.  PM2.5 
has an aerodynamic diameter of ≤ 2.5 
microns, and is also known as fine 
particulate matter.   
PM2.5 has been associated with heart and lung 
diseases at the lower respiratory regions 
including asthma (Brook, Franklin, Cascio, 
Hong, Howard, & Lipsett, 2004; Pope, 2000). 
PM10 has been associated with lung damage 
especially in the upper-respiratory regions, 
heart disease, cancer, and myocardial 
infarctions (Al-Kohlani & Campbell, 2016; 
Mustafic, Jabre, Caussin, Murad, Escolano, & 
Tafflet, 2012). 
Ozone (O3) 
Rather than being directly emitted, it is 
formed through sunlight that reacts with 
photoreactive chemicals—called 
precursors— of which NOx and VOC are the 
dominant precursor pollutants and will be 
used to calculate the composite measure. 
Ozone exposure in humans has been 
associated with cardiopulmonary effects 
including inflammation of the respiratory 
system and decreased lung capacity as well as 
reduced fetal growth (Hansen et al., 2008; 
USEPA, 2013; Uysal & Schapira, 2003). 
 
The legal mechanism Congress established to meet the NAAQS—the state 
implementation plans (SIP)—are developed by each state; reviewed; and approved by the 
USEPA.  Though these SIPs are set forth in the code of federal regulations, state environmental 
agencies “have spent many resources redoing and revising their SIPs ever since” and share 





established (Martineau & Novello, 2004, pp. 6, 13).  The SIPs establish the states’ legal 
responsibility to ensure each air quality control region of the state achieves, or maintains, the 
NAAQS.  A large part of the state-level oversight of the NAAQS program is the network of 
ambient air monitoring stations that states operate to assess compliance with USEPA standards 
(Johnson & Graham, 2005).  Despite meaningful reductions, emissions from fine particulate 
matter accounts for over 100,000 to 200,000 premature deaths per year (Caiazzo et al., 2013; 
Goodkind et al., 2019).  Therefore, the monitoring of criteria pollutant emissions remains a key 
focus, and cost, for state environmental agencies.    
To keep track of the air pollution severity among the states, the USEPA compiles the 
Green Book (USEPA, 2018b).  Figure 7 provides a map of the counties that are currently 
designated as in non-attainment or maintenance with the NAAQs as of June, 2018 (USEPA, 
2018b).  As Figure 7 depicts, nearly every state has an air quality control region that is either in 
nonattainment or maintenance with the NAAQs and many regions are in nonattainment, or 
maintenance, for more than one pollutant.  As Durant (2017) observed, “nearly two-thirds of US 













Figure 7.   
Counties Designated as Nonattainment or Maintenance with Clean Air Act’s NAAQs 
 
Note. Figure from USEPA (2018c).   
   
The persistent prevalence of NAAQS nonattainment across the US and the regulatory-based 
approach—implemented at the state level—to reduce criteria pollutant emissions, supports 
thematically categorizing environmental pollution as a legal factor in the conceptual model 
(Souza, Davis, & Shire, 2011, p. 62).   
Despite the previous academic literature on criteria pollutants, there is an extant gap in 
research on the influence of CO2 emissions and environmental budgets while “GHG emissions 
have increased roughly 61 percent since 1990 and the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere has 





Environmental Protection Agency (2007), the Supreme Court facilitated a reshaping of the 
contours of environmental governance in the US ascribing legitimacy to the nation’s attempts to 
address GHG emissions.  Leading up to Massachusetts, USEPA had not issued an endangerment 
finding for GHGs; therefore, the agency had not promulgated emissions standards to mitigate 
CO2 emissions—the primary cause of GCC (Hansen, Sato, Kharecha, & von Schuckmann, 
2011).   CO2 is the most prevalent GHG pollutant accounting for 75% of global GHG emissions 
and 82% of domestic GHG emissions (USEPA, 2018d).  Figure 8 demonstrates the increases in 
global CO2 which are projected to double by 2020 and double again by 2050 (Nejat, Jomehzadeh, 
Taheri, Gohari, Majid, 2015).   
Figure 8.   
Growth in Global CO2 Emissions, 1971 - 2011  
 
Note. From Martin & Saikawa (2017).   
 
Further, data from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), provided in Figure 9, 






Figure 9.   
Growth in Concentrations of CO2, 2006 – 2019   
    
Note. From NASA (2019).   
 
Nearly all air pollutant data in USEPA databases are collected by states; most of the 
financial requirements for enforcement are funded by the states; and more than three-quarters of 
resources needed to address air quality are derived from state-source revenues (Heckman, 2012; 
Potoski & Woods, 2002; Rabe, 2007).  Thus, the underlying driver for appropriations to grow in 
response to air pollution is due to public sector costs to implement programs necessary to carry-
out statutory requirements and policy initiatives (e.g. NAAQS air monitoring, writing permits, 
managing programs, conducting inspections, and pursuing enforcement actions).  From the 
literature, we learn that “states tailor the vigor of their enforcement programs [thus costs] to fit 
the scope of the pollution problem” (Potoski & Woods, 2002, p. 213).  Evidence from the 
academic literature supports this proposition revealing that states tend to enact more stringent 
pollution control regulations based on the pollution severity within the state (Lester et al., 1983; 
Lester & Lombard, 1990; Ringquist, 1994).  The increased regulations and increased personnel 
costs represent approximately 70 percent of subnational government expenditures across state 





A fundamental argument in this dissertation is that the fiscal responsiveness of 
environmental agencies ought to be increasing in response to the persistence of elevated criteria 
pollutant emissions and exorbitant ambient concentrations of CO2 (NASA, 2019).  However, as 
O’Hare (2006) pointed-out, it is up to the public agency to make their case for increased 
appropriations; as one legislator observed “we can’t justify giving them more money, when 
there’s no analytic basis for that justification” (p. 529).  Along a similar vein, it is argued the 
political pressure created by environmental problems are matched by governmental responses 
but only when conditions are conducive (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Hays et al., 1996; Konisky & 
Woods, 2012; Lowry, 1992; Newmark & Witko, 2007; Potoski & Woods, 2002).   
Studies of the connection between pollution and environmental budgets proliferated in 
the 1990s (Agthe et al., 1996; Davis & Feiock, 1992; Lester, 1995; Lester & Lombard, 1990; 
Ringquist, 1993; 1994; 1995).  One study found pollution “to be the most substantial 
determinant” of environmental expenditures among the states analyzed out of the ten variables 
assessed (Bacot & Dawes, 1997, p. 129).  Though informative, these studies were followed by 
only a few studies (e.g. Clark & Whitford, 2011; Konisky & Woods, 2012; Newmark & Witko, 
2008).  Based on a review of the literature, there is a research consensus on the relationship 
between pollution and environmental spending which supports pollution severity as a key focal 
variable.  However, a review of the literature reveals a lack of research on the influence of 
business interests and budgets despite our understanding of the polluting sectors’ overwhelming 
impact on US environmental policy.     
Rosenbaum (2017) observed “no interest has exploited the right to take part in the 
governmental process more pervasively or successfully than has business” (p. 45).  In the early 





interests in policymaking was hi-lighted (Buchanan & Tullock, 1975).  Olson (1965) attributed 
the aptitude of business interests to impact public policy to their capacity to unify and share 
resources to achieve specific policy objectives.  This perspective was reinforced by Baumgartner 
and Leech (2001) who found business interests were the most politically active; had the largest 
membership across all interest group categories; and spent roughly 85% of their funds on 
lobbying efforts.  Moreover, special interests are often concentrated at the state-level, thus are 
expected to apply pressure on state governments in particular (Lee et al., 2013; Ringquist, 1994).   
Supporting an emphasis at the state-level, Rabe (2017) observed business interests 
composed of heavily-polluting activities were very active, and largely successful, in lobbying 
state legislators for reduced industry taxes.  This reduced tax revenue has a consequent effect on 
the states’ general funds, thus resources available for environmental agency budgets.  In another 
study of business interests and public policy, O’Hare (2006) found that business groups lobby for 
reduced user fees for permits which consequently reduces agency funds.  This study argued 
when business interests are active, governments’ fiscal responsiveness to pollution severity is 
undermined due to politically-motivated, and connected, interests seeking to minimize their 
share of the fixed and variable costs associated with environmental compliance.  Thus, rational 
self-interested member firms join business interest groups to achieve material benefits despite 
their individual firm-level costs of joining which, Olson observed, would generally be a 
dissuasive force to joining (Lyons, 1999).   
The costs businesses seek to reduce with this lobbying activity include regulatory 
compliance costs estimated at over $200 billion per year—60 percent of which “are borne by 
corporations seeking to meet their statutory obligations” (Kraft, 2017, p. 78).  As it relates to 





status leads to increased firm-level costs for regulatory compliance (Becker, 2005; Carr, 2011b).  
For example, these increased industrial sector costs are partly attributable to the technology-
based regulations set forth under the Clean Air Act (e.g. New Source Performance Standards and 
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants).   
Durant (2017) noted that environmental agency’s authority to promulgate pollution 
abatement regulations is impeded by business interests via lawsuits that either delay rulemaking; 
perpetuate the status quo; or result in carve-outs for politically powerful industries.  Along a 
similar vein, business interests have an effect on budget policy through their efforts, and success, 
at blocking these environmental regulations—particularly those aimed at reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions (Baumgartner & Leech, 2001; Falke, 2011).  To the extent lobbying by business 
interests prevents rule promulgation, this places downward pressure on environmental budgets 
given a reduced need for additional personnel for implementation.   
Given these influences, the impacts of business interests on environmental public policy 
has been the focus of research for several decades (Davies & Davies, 1975; Dell, 2009; Hays et 
al., 1996; Moore & Giovinazzo, 2011).  While Bacot and Dawes (1997) found no meaningful 
direct influence between business interests and environmental policy, other research found 
business interests had a negative influence on state agency funding, spending, and effort (Clark 
& Whitford, 2011; Konisky & Woods, 2012).  Despite the theoretical and practical justifications 
for examining the interaction effects of business interests and environmental pollution on 
appropriations, business interests have mostly been hypothesized to exert only “simple main 
effects” on appropriations (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Jaccard & Turrisi, 





direction—(i.e. negative)—with the coefficient on the regression term statistically significant in 
two of the three studies.   
Though this previous literature revealed the importance of business interests as an 
important political factor, only one study examined the interaction of business interests and 
pollution on environmental appropriations.  In that study, Newmark and Witko (2007) did not 
find evidence environmental problems led to greater expenditures directly though their analysis 
did highlight the interaction between special interests and pollution, thus marking a key scholarly 
contribution regarding the conditional nature of the relationship between pollution and funding.  
More specifically, the authors found the coefficient on the interaction term was not significant 
thus concluded no interaction which differs from the statistical analysis interpretation and 
approach used in this dissertation.  It deserves mentioning that Newmark and Witko’s (2007) 
study was based on only one year of data; used a different fiscal measure; and relied upon 
business registrants versus business interest measures with greater representation in the academic 
literature (Bacot & Dawes, 1996; 1997; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Konisky & Woods, 2012).   
To review, this dissertation does not examine the direct effect of pollution on 
appropriations, since environmental agencies are but one actor in budget proposal formulation.  
After all, public budgeting involves the “interaction of numerous players”, and stakeholders have 
varying values and objectives that indirectly condition this complex process (Lindblom, 1982; 
Willoughby & Finn, 1996, p. 524).  While environmental public managers have a sense of the 
pollution severity in their state and, presumably, broker that knowledge to public budgeters for 
the funding that would otherwise be appropriated to another agency (O’Hare, 2006), I posit that 
business interests conditions must be sufficiently low so as not to undermine fiscal 





Rational self-interest theory, together with the academic literature, informs my decision 
to posit the relationship between environmental pollution and environmental appropriations is 
moderated—depending on the prevalence of polluting business interests among the states.  That 
is, I expect agency appropriations in response to air pollution will vary across the continuum of 
business interests.  Providing theoretical support for an interactive effect is Lyons (1999) who 
pointed-out the influence of industrial interest groups as explicated through rational self-interest 
theory drawing from Olson’s seminal work.   
Again, from the academic literature, Bromley-Trujillo (2016) posited, and found, that 
states with a higher concentration of business interests, such as in the mining sector, would be 
less likely to support environmentally proactive policies.  It follows that business interests 
condition the relationship between pollution and budgets given that public-sector remedies for 
negative externalities involve imposing firm-level expenditures “equal to the marginal cost of 
pollution” to achieve socially desirable outcomes (Stiglitz, 1986, p. 185).  Thus, the effect of 
pollution on environmental budgets is such that as business interest levels increase so too does 
lobbying pressure to stymie legislative and regulatory efforts to curb pollution.  After all, these 
pollution abatement regulations increase costs for those industrial sectors that contribute the most 
to air pollution (e.g. utilities, manufacturing, and mining sources) which include increased capital 
expenditures for pollution control equipment.  This increased lobbying by business interests is 
hypothesized to undermine what would otherwise be a more responsive association between 
pollution and agency budget policy reflective of an aspirational principle of fiscally responsive 
environmental governance.  That is, state environmental agencies appropriate more in response 
to pollution severity but only when business interest conditions are sufficient to accommodate 





H1: Air pollution severity will increase environmental agency budgets, if levels 
of polluting business interests of states are sufficiently low. 
 
2.3.2.2. Civic environmentalism influencing budgets.  
Linking the allegiances that emerge in civil society (Wapner & Kantel, 2017) to 
environmental concerns, John (2004) conceptualized civic environmentalism as a participatory 
embodiment of environmental governance focused on environmental protection.  Including this 
variable does not require that citizens are particularly focused on pollution and environmental 
budgets.  After all, “for many agencies, many citizens will not have very clear ideas regarding 
the agency’s current level of funding or what funding would be suitable for next year” (Nice, 
2002, p. 59).  However, as Basu and Devaraj (2014) noted, citizens are notably “proactive about 
cleaning up the air they breathe”, thus establishing a logical connection between civil society and 
environmental budget policy (p. 936).  It has been argued that this civil support is needed by 
“decisionmakers– who may be less able to steer society in a hierarchical way” in setting 
environmental agency budget policy (Glucker, Driessen, Kolhoff, & Runhaar, 2013).     
Also referred to as decision-making “environmentalism” (Clark & Whitford, 2011), or 
“legislative greenness” (Konisky & Woods, 2012), civic environmentalism is represented by the 
voting records on environmental legislation and is indicative of how favorable a states’ citizenry 
is to environmental protection policy (Clark & Whitford, 2011; Fowler, 2016).  Civic 
environmentalism relates to the environmental political climate existing during the budget 
deliberation phase (Willoughby & Finn, 1996).  In this dissertation, the concept reflects the 
extent to which the federal legislative delegation for a state is formulating and legitimating 
environmentally proactive policy.   
From the public budgeting literature, it is offered “decisions must be made by the 





Academic research shows when civil society demands specific environmental outcomes, for 
example, enhanced air quality or stricter regulations on lead in drinking water, civic 
environmentalism influences public policy (Fukuyama, 2001; Hays, 2000; Li & Reuveny, 2006; 
List & Sturm, 2006).  Previous researchers observed citizens exert control over environmental 
conditions through their voting preferences for “political candidates with strong environmental 
agendas” underscoring the importance of empirically assessing this variable (Takahashi, Tandoc, 
Duan, Van Witsen, 2017).  Butler and Nickerson (2011) explained this linkage between 
constituents and voting behavior as a function of the elected officials’ attempts to avoid, or at 
least minimize, electoral retribution, or backlash which finds support in the political science 
literature (Arnold, 1992; Kim & Urpelainen, 2017).   
Findings from previous research on the association between civic environmentalism and 
state environmental agency budgets are limited and mixed.  While some studies observe that 
citizen greenness (i.e. civic environmentalism) and involvement had limited, or even negative, 
impacts on governmental policy-making (Fiorino, 1989; Steinemann, 2000; Ventriss & Kuentzel, 
2005), other scholarship revealed the positive influence of citizen involvement (Bingham, 
Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005; Neshkova & Guo, 2012).  For example, while Clark and Whitford 
(2011) found legislative greenness increased funding, research by Konisky and Woods (2012) 
revealed an inverse relationship.  The latter study offers a particularly interesting finding, since it 
implies states with citizens who elect a “greener” federal legislative delegation fund their 
environmental agencies less than states with environmentally-laggard federal legislators.  Basu 
and Devaraj (2014) analyzed the association between civil greenness and environmental policy 





finding that, on the whole, this variable had the largest positive impact on air pollution abatement 
spending compared to other programs.   
While a related concept of pro-environmental behavior of citizens has been evaluated in 
previous research (Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Clark & Whitford, 2011; Davis & Feiock, 1992; Hall 
& Kerr, 1991), the operationalization often involves datasets that are either not continuously 
updated, or are unavailable for empirical analysis—(e.g. current environmental group 
membership data are often not shared by the groups) (Anderson, 2011).  In addition to the 
practical obstacles (e.g. data availability and reliability), the concept civic environmentalism is 
used to provide an electoral-based linkage of similar attributes that environmental interest group 
membership captures.  For example, Anderson (2011) noted the congruence between League of 
Conservation Voter (LCV) scores—used to operationalize the concept in this dissertation—and 
environmental groups, supporting the notion that these concepts, though different, are capturing 
overlapping, similar, dimensions.  
Previous research finds state-level environmental and natural resource spending is 
positively influenced by state environmental group activism, and states’ congressional delegation 
positions on environmental issues corresponded to increased funds (Clark & Whitford, 2011).  
That study, however, focused on natural resource spending combined with environmental 
protection spending and analyzed civic environmentalism through a surrogate measure that 
relied upon the per capita membership in environmental groups (e.g. Sierra Club membership).  
Alternatively, this dissertation applies a concept that affords examination of the linkages between 
states’ civic-legislative environmental demands with state-source funding (Agyeman & Angus, 
2003; Knopman, et al., 1999) leading to the hypothesis that follows.   






2.3.2.3. Climate policies influencing budgets.  
Fiack and Kamieniecki (2015) observed in response to federal government inaction, 
states have taken the lead at formulating and implementing climate change policies.  States often 
compensate for a lack of federal climate change policy “by developing, replicating, and 
collaboratively implementing climate change policies” (Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2016, p. 544).  
Despite these trends, “while research on the policy and politics of state-level climate change 
policymaking has grown in recent years, the amount and scope of research has not kept pace 
with growth in the saliency and urgency of the climate change issue” (Rabe, 2010, p. 264).  
Since there has been no prior literature on the influence of climate policies on environmental 
agency budgets, this section will summarize efforts taken to mitigate CO2 emissions; will 
provide justification for the measure of state-level policies used; and will conclude with the 
hypothesis.   
Global climate change is caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions, and the impacts are 
extensive involving: increasing mean sea levels; increasing ambient temperatures; increasing 
frequency and severity of storms; changes in biodiversity; species migration; changing of climate 
patterns; and increased foodborne pathogens and illnesses (Axelrod & VanDeveer, 2017; Lake & 
Barker, 2018; Lesnikowski et al., 2013; Neumann et al., 2015).  These endpoints, the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) points out, “have significant 
implications for extreme weather events, development, economic stability, and population and 
economic health” (IPCC, 2000; IPCC, 2007; Lesnikowski et al., 2013).   
Despite the advent of meaningful federal regulations to reduce GHG emissions, in 
November, 2015 the US Senate blocked the Clean Power Plan—the rule promulgated under the 





in West Virginia et al. USEPA et al. (2016).  The Supreme Court went on to issue a stay of the 
Clean Power Plan in 2016 marking the first issuance of a Supreme Court stay to block 
implementation of a USEPA rule in the Court’s history.  The torpid pace by which the national 
government has legitimated policies aimed at curbing GHG emissions contrasts with an 
increased tempo in mandatory climate policy legitimation at the subnational levels of 
government to address these emissions—predominately of CO2 (Nelson, Rose, Wei, Peterson, & 
Wennberg, 2015; Posner, 2010).  As Figure 10 depicts, the CO2 emissions vary by state.   
Figure 10.   
CO2 State-Level Emissions from Power Generation Sector, 2014   
 
Note: From Martin & Saikawa (2017).   
With an Executive Order signed on March 28, 2017, the Trump (2017) administration 
directed the recension and revocation of several Obama administration environmental policies 
aimed at curbing emissions and building greater understanding about the impacts of GHGs.  
These steps, and steps like them at the federal level leave a policy-vacuum that states continue to 
fill.  The cascade of state energy and GHG reduction policies that ramped-up just after the case 





environmental governance.  For example, within a few years after the ruling in Massachusetts, 
35 states had climate action plans with mandatory emissions reduction targets (Randolph, 2012).   
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) gained relevance as one of a few 
market-based cap-and trade emissions reduction programs.  The current structure of RGGI sets a 
mandatory cap for participating states and requires a 2.5% decrease in CO2 emissions, each year, 
from 2015 to 2020 (RGGI, 2017).  If Virginia joins the current group of participating states, 
there will be 11 member states participating in RGGI.  A similar GHG reduction program is 
underway in the western US (Western Climate Initiative, 2018).  “All told, a total of 20 states 
have adopted explicit emissions reduction targets, 34 have adopted climate action plans to guide 
future initiatives and meet goals, and 30 states have binding [Renewable Performance Standard] 
RPS targets to increase the share of renewables in their energy grids” (Cyrs, 2018, p. 2).   
Subnational governments have largely taken the lead in GHG mitigation policies post-
Massachusetts (Martin & Saikawa, 2017; Yi & Feiock, 2015).  Cyrs (2018) observes, state 
governments continue to set policies “on-par with that of the most ambitious EU countries” (p. 
1).  The trend of state governments filling ever-expanding roles will require a commensurate 
level of financial commitment to formulate and implement the necessary environmental policies.  
Accordingly, this dissertation focuses on the category of policies state policymakers have 
advanced to mitigate GHG emissions—that is, the climate policies that will “change the energy 
landscape in ways that have implications for GHG emissions and climate change” and that have 
been “easier to garner bipartisan support” (Martin & Saikawa, 2017, p. 912).   
Within the conceptual model, this variable is a legal factor that represents the extent to 
which states have adopted mandatory policies to mitigate CO2 emissions.  As noted, the lack of 





climate action through subnational policies due to compensatory federalism (Posner, 2010; 
Nelson et al., 2015).  “States are likely to have primary implementation authority for most 
economy-wide and sector-level federal climate policies, such as power plant combustion 
efficiency standards” (Nelson et al., 2015, p. 98).  Given the extent to which states have taken 
great strides in recent years to mitigate GHG emissions through regulatory programs which 
require government revenues to administer, I hypothesize a positive influence of these policies 
on environmental appropriations.   
H3: Mandatory climate policies will result in higher environmental agency budgets. 
 
2.3.2.4. Legislative professionalization influencing budgets. 
  The uncertainties in the scientific understanding of environmental pollution and the risks 
it poses (Steinemann, 2000), create tensions that make setting an appropriate level of 
environmental appropriations as much a political as a scientific endeavor (Stone, 2014).  As 
Rosenbaum observed, resolving these issues within the political process that “arise in making 
scientific and political judgements compatible are two of the most troublesome characteristics of 
environmental politics” (2016, p. 133).  Legislative professionalization reflects the “institutional 
capacity within state legislatures and legislators” (Squire, 2017, p. 1).  This political factor 
represents the capacity of state legislatures to analyze and process information related to 
formulating and legitimating public policy (Squire, 2012; 2017).   
Mooney (1995) observed that increased professionalism of legislators enhances their 
ability to broker information; facilitates engagement with other actors in the budgeting process; 
and results in greater control and influence over the budget.  Previous research (e.g. Hays et al., 
1996) found states with more professionalized legislatures have more protective environmental 





the influence on environmental agency funding.  In that study, Konisky and Woods (2012) found 
no statistically significant association between professionalization and state environmental 
spending and revealed an unanticipated inverse relationship between professionalism and the 
stringency of state environmental agencies.  This is a somewhat surprising result given that one 
might expect more professionalized state legislatures to increase appropriations in response to 
pollution problems to avoid preemption by USEPA (Heckman, 2012; Wood, 1991).  Preemption 
is taken by USEPA when “subnational government performance is unsatisfactory” (Wood, 1991, 
p. 852), and is avoided by states given the resulting consolidation of power at the national level 
(i.e. loss of agency autonomy) (Nelson et al., 2015).    
While scientific uncertainty can make the process of identifying adequate appropriations 
levels more difficult, higher levels of organizational capacity should “theoretically yield more 
effective program management” and, consequently, increasingly responsive budget policy (Bacot 
& Dawes, 1996, p. 125).  Also, a positive association between professionalism and 
environmental budgets reflects an assertiveness by state legislators to champion budget policy 
that pursues constituent benefits related to environmental protection (Abney & Lauth, 1998; Ryu 
et al., 2008).  Taken together, professionalism of the legislature reflects the institutional capacity 
across the states to interpret the complex demands from the political process in response to 
environmental pollution, thus is hypothesized to have a positive influence on appropriations 
(Cline, 2003).  
H4: Legislative professionalization will have a positive influence on 
environmental agency budgets. 
 
2.3.2.5. Partisan ideology and environmental budgets. 
  The public budgeting scholar Robert Bland (2007) described the effect of partisan, or 





public budgeting operate along a continuum—ranging from an intrusion on what ought to be a 
wholly technical process—to a necessary feature needed to attenuate conflict between groups 
and bring about resolution (Rubin, 2010).  As it relates to this section, politics refer to the 
ideology of state legislatures reflected by each party’s relative control over state government 
following a two-party model (i.e. Republican or Democrat).   
Numerous academic studies suggest liberal and Democrat-identifying individuals tend to 
express greater support for environmental programs and policies than Republicans (Davis & 
Fisk, 2014; Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 2001; Fowler & Breen, 2013; Konisky, Milyo, & 
Richardson, 2008).  That is, while environmental protection had been a relatively “politically 
consensual” issue area for elected officials for many decades, Democrats have become more 
supportive of environmentally proactive policies compared to Republicans particularly with 
regard to public policies aimed at addressing air pollutants (Bromley-Trujillo, Butler, Poe, & 
Davis, 2016; Davis & Fisk, 2014; Dunlap & Gale, 1974; Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008; 
McCright, Xiao, & Dunlap, 2014, p. 251).  A growing body of research underscores the direct 
role that partisan identification has on public policy (Cragg, Zhou, Gurney, & Kahn, 2013; 
Elazar, 1984; Kraft & Furlong, 2015).  In their analysis of the effects of partisan ideology on 
USEPA budgets, Balint and Conant (2013) advanced a conceptual model that included a 
prominent role for partisan political factors.  Other research, however, suggests the influence of 
partisan identification on environmental policy is inconsistent at best (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; 
Ringquist, 1993).   
Considered a political factor in the conceptual model for this dissertation, political 
ideological orientations impact public budgeting along several points in the policy process.  For 





spend increased revenues forecasted by their budget offices (Bland, 2007).  More specifically, 
cutting taxes is often sought by conservatives, or Republicans, while increasing spending for 
government programs is typically associated with Democrat control of government (Lee et al., 
2013).  Supporting assertions of these direct effects from the public budgeting literature, are 
empirical findings that reveal an inverse relationship between Republican-control and state 
agency appropriations (Ryu et al., 2008).   
McCright et al. (2014) observed that political preferences have become one of the most 
powerful predictors of environmental policy based on their review of survey data from the 
general public and their canvassing of previous research.  Adding to the studies that show overall 
liberal and Democrat-identifying individuals express greater support for environmental programs 
and policies, Wan, Shen, and Choi (2017) found similar linkages between partisan ideology and 
environmental support observed in their cross-national study of European countries.  Instead of 
being a “politically consensual” issue as it was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, McCright et al. 
(2014) found the percentage of respondents who perceived the government spends too little on 
the environment decreased substantially for Republicans between 1974 and 2012 while such a 
downward trend was not observable among Democrat respondents (p. 251).  Notably, the 
responses between the survey participants who self-identified as liberal rather than conservative 
highly corresponded to the Democrat versus Republican self-identification.  The survey 
responses in Figure 11 depict the percentages of self-identified Republicans and Democrats 
reporting on their perception that national government spending on the environment is “too 








Perceptions of Environmental Spending by Party-Affiliation  
 
Note.  From McCright et al., 2014.   
While some literature found no empirical evidence of ideology impacting environmental 
policy based on the partisan-control of state government (Anderson, 2011; Balint & Conant, 
2013) other scholarship revealed an important influence (e.g. Clark & Whitford, 2011; Konisky 
& Woods, 2012; Woods et al., 2008).  More specifically, Clark and Whitford (2011) found that 
“the demand for environmental spending is met with resistance by republican unified control of 
state legislative and executive branches” (p. 149).  Similarly, Konisky and Woods (2012) found 
states under Democrat control realized higher environmental spending and more environmental 
enforcement, ceteris paribus.  Overall, despite the literature highlighting the influence of partisan 
ideology on state environmental policy (Dunlap & Gale, 1974; Hays et al., 1996; Lombard, 
1990), there are only a few studies that examine to what extent partisan ideology of the state 
legislatures influences appropriations.  For example, Clark and Whitford (2011) found that under 





higher—an increase of $10.8 million—than under Republican control—a decrease of $24.1 
million at the state-level.   This effect was observable only at the state-level of funding (i.e. there 
was no significant relationship at the federal-level)—a finding that provides further support for 
the following hypothesis. 
H5: Liberal ideology will have a positive influence on environmental agency 
budgets. 
 
The role of political partisanship on public budgeting decisions is particularly distinctive 
in democracies due to the comparative openness of the budgetary decisions allowing the process 
to be shaped by external factors including by political parties (Nice, 2002; Rubin, 2010).  How 
precisely political ideology influences appropriations, however, is less clear.  For example, it has 
been argued that “[environmental] problem severity does not directly influence spending, but 
instead, the severity of environmental problems is filtered through the political process” 
suggesting an interaction, or conditional, effect of political ideology on appropriations versus a 
main effect (Newmark & Witko, 2007, p. 303).  Further complicating the picture, is another 
possibility.   
Partisan ideology could act as a mediator in the relationship between pollution and 
appropriations—representing a discernable process that helps explain the causal relationship 
between pollution and budgets.  Hypothesis 5 has been developed with sufficient attention to 
these ambiguities (e.g. viewing partisan ideology as a moderator, or mediator) and with 
deference to the academic literature where examining the main effect has resonance.  While I do 
not deny either of these alternatives (e.g. moderation or mediation) are appropriate ways in 
which to view the role of partisan ideology in the context of air pollution and appropriations, it is 
also defensible to test for the existence of a relatively straightforward direct relationship (i.e. 





Republicans).  Nevertheless, future avenues for research, discussed in Chapter 5, includes an 
alternative to examining the direct effects of political ideology on appropriations.   
2.3.2.6. Fiscal capacity influencing budgets.  
State fiscal capacity is defined as the “ability of a state to raise revenues to meet its 
spending requirements”, and it is categorized as a fiscal factor in the conceptual model for this 
dissertation (Lee et al., 2013, p. 553).  Environmental regulations require compliance and 
enforcement efforts at the state-level which cost money, so a state’s wealth can determine the 
resources regulators have to implement policy.  In public budgeting, revenues are a driving force 
behind expenditures, thus policymakers, particularly chief executives, can be expected to a “set 
broad budget ceiling for overall spending and revenues based on…the overall availability and 
certainty of…expected resources” particularly for state-source funding (Ryu et al., 2008).   
Long-term economic forces, such as the wealth of a state’s economy can have enduring 
effects on spending for public programs—that is, patterns suggest that, ceteris paribus, a rich 
state will often spend more than a poorer state (Nice, 2002).  “Fiscal and economic climates of 
the state and nation perhaps most overtly influence state budget management capacity; a poor 
economy generates fewer revenues and greater expenditure needs of governments” (Willoughby, 
2008, p. 433).  Similarly, in a seminal work on state agency budgets, Sharkansky (1968) found 
high levels of expenditures and debt among the states caused appropriations committees to 
provide less funds to the acquisitive agencies.   
Kraft and Furlong (2015) observed that though states have achieved greater economic 
capacity for environmental policy over the past four decades, there remain large variations in 
funding.  Considered together, these observations justify consideration of whether states can be 





Dawes (1996), the financial resources a state has speaks to the capacity of that state to implement 
policies and programs that ensure compliance with the regulations promulgated under the 
enabling legislation (e.g. Clean Air Act).   
Based on a closer examination of the environmental policy literature, it has been 
suggested, and sometimes demonstrated, the capacity to raise revenue can either enable, or 
constrain environmental spending and protection efforts (Agthe et al., 1996; Bacot & Dawes, 
1997; Newmark & Wiko, 2007; Ringquist, 1993).  That is, even though environmental agency 
public managers are quantifying and conveying the pollution problem and presuming legislators 
are grasping what these agencies require, oftentimes “there’s [just] not enough to go around” 
(O’Hare, 2006, p. 529).  In other words, public budgets are sensitive to the certainty and 
availability of expected revenues (Ryu et al., 2008).  Also from the environmental policy 
literature, we have learned the demand for public goods—like environmental protection—tends 
to rise with state wealth (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Hays et al., 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012; 
Lowry, 1992; Potoski & Woods, 2002).  Relatedly, “regulation costs money”; therefore, I 
hypothesize as fiscal capacity is higher across the states, so too will be appropriations for 
environmental protection (Ringquist, 1993, p. 88).   
H6: Fiscal capacity will have a positive influence on environmental agency budgets. 
The next section will begin by describing the role of fiscal federalism as it relates to the level of 
analysis in this dissertation. 
2.4. Literature Emphasizing State-Level of Analysis 
Fiscal federalism informs the focus on state own-source funding in my study.  This 
“subfield of public finance” involves fiscal decentralization based on a belief that state 





policy functions (e.g. growth, unemployment, inflation) for which federal government control is 
preferred (Oates, 1999, p. 1120).  Oates (1999) is further instructive in relating fiscal federalism 
to environmental governance noting that the system enabled states to experiment and innovate on 
air pollution control where there was “serious doubt” such actions would have been taken at the 
national level (p. 1132).  As Greer and Denison (2016) observed, fiscal federalism involves 
decentralization and devolution of authorities and is driven in “large part by political institutions 
and fiscal traditions that change slowly over time” and for which a preference grows by civil 
society to demand greater responsiveness from subnational levels of government (p. 126).   
The dynamics and factors that influence state and federal-source funding of state agencies 
are not identical with states acting much more as “fiscal free agents” having more discretion over 
their fiscal policy than the central government (Endersby & Towle, 1997; Mikesell, 2018, p. 215; 
Sharkansky, 1968).  Similarly, Nice (2002) observed, “most states permit agencies to submit 
their original budget requests to the state legislature, along with the governor’s budget 
recommendation.  That practice probably gives [state] agency personnel more opportunities to be 
advocates for their programs, in contrast to the national government’s use of central clearance” 
(p. 65).  When considered together, the research suggests that while state-source and federal-
source environmental budget policy are related, they are not identical (Clark & Whitford, 2011); 
therefore, should not be aggregated in empirical analyses.  A closer look at federal-source 
environmental funding reinforces this latter point.    
Two decades ago, 70 percent of the budgetary requirements of state environmental 
agencies was provided by the federal government; by the early 2000s, this level shrank to only 
30 percent (Woods et al., 2008), and continues to decrease (ECOS, 2017a).  Moreover, between 





increased 415% and 980%, respectively, while transfer funding to environmental agencies 
decreased 12% (Gormley, 2006).  In addition, historically states have had to either spend more of 
their own general funds, or to raise revenue through additional industry fees to meet federal 
pollution laws (Davis and Lester, 1987).  Moreover, what little federal-source dollars do flow to 
the environmental agencies are not for discretionary use but are either dedicated clean-up funds, 
or to resource specific grant programs (USEPA, 2018a).  Overall, state funding sources 
contribute nearly 80% of state environmental budgets (ECOS, 2017b) and most of the 
discretionary environmental funding.   
Lester and Lombard (1990) observed, state environmental policy research continues to 
specify models on the assumption federal-level variables will not affect state policy outputs, or 
vice versa.  Offering several examples that dispel this conventional wisdom, they concluded that 
future state environmental policy research would be improved by considering the national and 
subnational levels of government in explaining state policy outputs.  Thus, federal-source 
funding, along with state population, is included within the conceptual model revisited in Figure 
12, to control for its effects on state own-source funding.   
Figure 12.  Conceptual Model of Dissertation     
 
 
Further supporting the state-level of analysis are two additional concepts—federalism, 





and devolution—“the shift in functions or responsibilities from one jurisdiction to another” 
(Woods & Potoski, 2010, p. 722).  While the USEPA develops policy through rulemakings to 
implement the environmental laws enacted by Congress, many USEPA authorities are delegated 
to the states.  Given that the majority of states are Dillon’s Rule states and major environmental 
regulations are codified in federal and state statues, the devolution of power to local governments 
is limited across a range of environmental protection functions (Stenberg, 1985).  For example, 
while there is an array of networks and initiatives at the local jurisdictional level, no official 
authorities are granted to localities through the Clean Air Act (Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Bardach & 
Patashnik, 2016; Fowler, 2016).   
The CAA confers authority to the USEPA to establish mandatory air emissions standards; 
directs the USEPA to establish programs to control and reduce air emissions from stationary (e.g. 
factories and power plants) and mobile (e.g. cars and trucks) sources; and grants certain limited 
discretionary authorities to the USEPA regarding when it must, and when it may refrain from, 
regulating specific air pollutants (Reitze, 2005).  Implementing the CAA at the federal and state 
level has come to involve a multi-layered environmental governance that derives from the US 
government’s federalist structure.  This structure accommodates a continuum of national versus 
state-level control over environmental policy (e.g. contested federalism, cooperative federalism, 
and compensatory federalism) having implications for designing research of state environmental 
policy (Durant et al., 2017).   
For example, though emissions standards for air pollutants are almost exclusively 
established through rules promulgated by the USEPA, the authority to formulate and implement 
environmental public policy, including compliance and enforcement activities, is shared with 





to as cooperative federalism—requires state governments to be active participants that request 
authorization from USEPA to administer their own environmental agencies.  Over the past 45 
years, there has been an overarching period of cooperative federalism which started with the 
federal government exercising its authority to set various national performance standards that all 
states must meet—minimum standards, or federal floors, that promote alignment with national 
environmental policy goals (ECOS, 2017a; Nelson et al., 2015).  Cooperative federalism 
involves an active role for states that request authorization from USEPA to address 
environmental pollution.  All 50 American states have received USEPA authorization to operate 
environmental agencies structured to achieve the national pollution standards, or state-specific 
pollution standards should the latter be equally, or more, protective (Konisky & Woods, 2016; 
Woods, 2006).     
Despite a period during the George W. Bush Administration in the 2000s where conflict 
between the federal and state environmental agencies over centralized authorities was the highest 
in the previous two decades (i.e. contested federalism) the decentralization of responsibilities 
from the central government to the states has been the general trend (Rabe, 2007).  Particularly 
noteworthy was the accelerated delegation of decisions regarding permitting and enforcement 
authority, responsibility, and accountability during the George H.W. Bush and Clinton 
administrations (Rabe, 2007).  This acceleration of devolution was aided by the National 
Academy of Public Administration (1995) that found increasing the role of state environmental 
agencies, in partnership with the federal government, would be crucial for effective, flexible, and 
accountable environmental governance.  Though there have been “ebbs and flows”, this 





redirecting environmental policy by contesting state air pollution control efforts (e.g. California) 
(Davis & Lester, 1987; Konisky & Woods, 2012, p. 544; 2018; Rabe, 2017). 
As an alternative to cooperative federalism, or the contested federalism that has recently 
welled-up again in environmental governance, Derthick (2010) noted that states have 
compensated for the lack of federal government action on pressing environmental issues, such as 
global climate change, ushering in a period of compensatory federalism—an environmental 
governance outcome facilitated by the courts, as the Supreme Court case of Massachusetts v. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (2007) laid bare.  The devolution of authority, 
responsibility, and accountability from the federal to the state environmental agencies has 
resulted in notable policies at the state-level which establish requirements that are more stringent 
than federal requirements (Chupp, 2011).   
Because of this decentralization, state environmental agencies, and their frontline 
workers, now execute 96 percent of the environmental workload; operate 75 percent of the 
environmental programs; and “collect nearly 95 percent of the data used by the USEPA” (ECOS, 
2017b; Rabe, 2007, p. 422; Rinfret & Pautz, 2013).  Their role is robust in carrying out the 
requirements of the CAA.  Though only 25% of the revenue to state air quality programs comes 
from federal-source funds, the majority of compliance and enforcement activities are executed 
by the state agencies as it relates to the control and abatement of criteria air pollutant emissions 
(Heckman, 2012).  All 50 states have been delegated authority to implement clean air policy—









Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1. Research Design 
This dissertation is based on a quantitative non-experimental research design using 
secondary data.  The following subsections provide more information on the unit of analysis, the 
time dimension, and research design.  These subsections are followed by the statistical analysis 
plan; validity and limitations before concluding with advantages, limitations and a restatement of 
the implications and contributions of this study.   
3.2. Time Dimension & Unit of Analysis 
The cases of research interest are the states, and the unit of analysis is the state 
environmental agency budget—for which each state has only one—and are listed in Table 2.  
Environmental agency budget data are either not available, or were reported as $0.00 for the 
following states: Florida, Louisiana, Iowa, North Carolina, New Jersey, and New Mexico.  The 
sample, is consequently reduced for general funds and fees and other sources according to the 
state environmental agencies that did respond with appropriations data to ECOS across the five 
years—2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015—which represent the years for which the most 
complete funding records are currently available (ECOS, 2012; 2017b).  The unit of analysis is 
each individual state environmental agency budget each year it is observed.  The quantity of 
entities, n = 47 (states); the time period t = 5 (2011 - 2015); and the quantity of observations T 
ranges from 250 to 232 given the aforementioned lack of data for certain years for the budget 
data particularly for appropriations from the general fund.   
This reduced sample size —and correspondingly larger standard errors—makes goodness 
of fit and detecting statistically significance more challenging which reinforces the need for 





detect statistical significance on the regression and interaction terms.  Despite not having a large 
sample size, the sample is compatible with the recommendation of Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) 
who recommended N > 50 + 8m (where m = quantity of independent variables).  That is, with 
nine variables, the threshold of 122 is exceeded suggesting adequacy of the sample size.   
This dataset structure is panel (i.e. longitudinal data); the values for the variables are for 
the same units (i.e. states) over several time periods (i.e. years) which is a useful data structure 
when investigating the behavior—in this case budgeting policy—of the same entities over time 
(Kennedy, 2008).  The preference of researchers to analyze panel data versus cross-sectional data 
derives from the increased variability and less collinearity between variables as well as 
opportunities to handle heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2001).  Though the periods for which the variable 
data are available are common to all panels (i.e. states), as noted above, each panel does not have 
the same quantity of observations; therefore, the panels are unbalanced.  Other than for the lack 
of appropriations data for a small quantity of states, each state does have the identical quantity of 
observations for the remaining variables across the five year panel.   
3.3. Variables, Datasets, Indicators, Hypotheses 
This study includes variables selected based on the integrated theory; inclusion of 
additional theories; consideration of public budgeting literature; and previous state 
environmental policy research.  The regression analysis provides an examination of the effects of 
independent variables on the dependent variable—environmental agency budgets.  Table 6 
provides data sources and variable descriptions that are relevant to the analysis—(e.g. datasets 
and indicators)—further explanations for the variables, including equations, are included within 







Study Variables, Units, and Operationalization  
Independent Variables  
Name Conceptualization Explanation / Units Source 
Air Pollutant 
Emissions 
Emissions from criteria 
pollutants and CO2 emissions)    
Pounds of Pollutants (ln) 
Calculated from (EIA, 2018; 
USEPA, 2018e; USEPA, 
2018f) 
Business Interests 
Business lobbying interests 
within the state as represented 
by polluting sectors 
(manufacturing, mining, 
utilities)   
Proportion of State GDP 
Contributed by Polluting 
Industrial Sectors as a 
Share of Total State 
GDP  [0 – 1] 
Calculated from Bureau of 





concerns of the state expressed 
by electoral preferences. 
Average LCV Score of 
State Delegation to 
Federal Legislature 
[0 – 100] 
Calculated from League of 
Conservation Voters Data 
(LCV, 2018) 
Climate Policies 
Mandatory state policies that 
directly mitigate GHGs. 
Raw Count 
[0 or 1] 
Compiled from Martin & 
Saikawa (2017); National 
Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL, 2019)  
Partisan Ideology 
Ideology of state legislature 
based on major party’s relative 
control over state government.   
Composite Measure 
(Index) of Democrat 
Control of State 
Government  [0 – 1] 
Calculated from (NCSL, 
2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 
2014); ProQuest, 2008; 2010; 
2012; 2016; 2019)  
Legislative 
Professionalization 
Institutional capacity of the 
state legislature. 
Composite Measure 
(Index) [0 – 1] 
Squire (2012; 2017) 
Fiscal Capacity 
Capacity to fund government 
as reflected by revenue 
generating potential.   
Unduplicated Sum of 
Gross State Product and 
State Personal Income in 
U.S. Dollars (TTR) (ln) 
U.S. Treasury (2019) 
Controls 





State environmental agency 
budget derived from federal-
source funding. 





State environmental agency 
budget derived from the 
general fund. 
U.S. Dollars (ln) ECOS (2012; 2017b) 
Environmental 
Agency Budget –
Fees & Other  
State environmental agency 
budget derived from fees and 
other sources. 






Each of the following subsections are followed by a brief overview of the literature that supports 
the proposed hypothesis for each of the study variables.   
3.3.1. Air pollutant emissions.  
 Environmental pollution is a negative externality produced by transactions between 
consumers and firms.  The lack of a profit motive for industries to address environmental 
pollution on their own leads to a public problem, since environmental pollution contaminates 
common resources (e.g. clean air and water).  The need for environmental agencies to be 
responsive to air pollution, in particular, is not confined to only one type of air pollutant.  In 
addition to criteria pollutant emissions, there has emerged a policy goal among states to mitigate 
anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) GHG emissions—principally CO2 emissions from industrial 
sectors of the economy.   
Konisky and Woods (2012) concluded “that the time has come for scholars to develop 
new measures whenever possible, with close consideration of how they can be used in a 
theoretically informed fashion to better our understanding of the factors that shape state 
environmental politics and policy” (p. 565).  To answer the call from previous scholarship, 
environmental pollution is measured in this study using two measures.  The first measure of air 
pollution is an interval-level composite index constructed from indicators comprised of six 
criteria air pollutants.  The second measure of air pollution is a ratio-level measure of CO2 
emissions.   
The emissions from criteria pollutants are obtained from USEPA’s National Emissions 
Inventory (USEPA, 2018e).  Following the approach of previous researchers, only the 
anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) criteria pollutant emissions are included (Simon et al., 2015).  





criteria pollutant emissions versus nonpoint source emissions are commonly employed indicators 
in studies involving air pollution.  This methodological decision is further justified given that 
criteria pollutant emissions are mostly impacted by state implementation efforts given the large 
emphasis on SIPs as previously discussed.  Moreover, control and abatement of mobile source 
emissions—the largest contributor to nonpoint source emissions—are largely the result of federal 
efficiency standards with the exception of California that has the authority to set its own vehicle 
engine standards.   
To take into account the large variability in the magnitudes of the six criteria pollutants, a 
criteria air pollution severity index (CAPSIDX) is developed by calculating a Z-score for each 
pollutant in each state-year.  Standardizing the criteria pollutant emissions transforms each value 
into comparable scores allowing the different pollutant emissions to be put on the same scale.  
The calculation of the standardized values involves subtracting the mean emissions for each 
pollutant for each state-year from each data point (i.e. emissions) following by dividing the result 
by the standard deviation.  The resulting Z-scores, or re-scaled, values are summed across each 
state-year creating a criteria air pollution severity index.  Principal components analysis—a 
specific technique of factor analysis—is used to group the pollutants for which the emissions 
strongly correlate.  Essentially, PCA allows assessment of whether the emissions for each of the 
pollutants load onto a single factor, thus provide an empirical summary of the data (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007).  The PCA results indicate the presence of one factor.  Two statistical measures 
assess the adequacy of the PCA which include the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity.  The KMO index value is 0.82 above the 
suggested minimum of 0.6, and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity reached statistical significance (p 





correlation coefficients within the range of r = 0.45 to r = 0.89—above the recommended value 
of r = 0.3 (Pallant, 2010).  The composite score (i.e. reliability coefficient) of the composite 
measure for criteria air pollution is also high (Cronbach’s α = 0.91) and above a recommended 
cutoff of 0.7 (DeVellis, 2003; Lance, Butts, & Michels, 2006).   
The following equation was used to calculate the values for this measure of air pollution 
with NOx emissions as the example: 
𝑍𝑁𝑂𝑥 =  
(  )  (   )
(   )
                                                                                                                           (1) 
Where ZNOxit is the standard score for NOx of the ith state in period t, 
NOx it is the quantity of NOx emissions of the ith state in period t, 
μ NOx i is the mean NOx emissions of the ith state, and 
σ is the standard deviation of NOx emissions of the ith state. 
The following equation gives the formula used to calculate the summed Z score calculated 
for each pollutant for each state-year: 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑋 = 𝑍  + 𝑍  +  𝑍  + 𝑍 .  + 𝑍  + 𝑍       
(2) 
Where CAPSIDX it is the criteria air pollution severity index (i.e. summed standard score of 
each constituent criteria pollutant Z-score of the ith state in period t), 
 Z NOx it is the standard score of NOx emissions from the ith state in period t, 
Z CO it is the standard score of CO emissions from the ith state in period t, 
Z PM-10 it is the standard score of PM-10 emissions from the ith state in period t, 
Z PM-2.5 it is the standard score of PM-2.5 emissions from the ith state in period t, 
Z SO2 it is the standard score of SO2 emissions from the ith state in period t, and 





GHG emissions are a composite of CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbon, 
hydrofluorocarbon, sulfur hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride (USEPA, 2018f).  Since CO2 
emissions represent the most prevalent—over 80%—of GHG emissions in the US, CO2 
emissions are assessed in this study (USEPA, 2018d).  The decision to use emissions inventory 
data of CO2 emissions is justified based also upon the currency of this methodological approach 
in the academic literature (Grant et al., 2014; Martin & Saikawa, 2017).  These data are available 
for each state, and each year, from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (EIA, 
2018).   
3.3.2. Business interests.   
While measurement of this variable ranges from indicators based on industry self-
policing (Lombard, 1993) to industry group membership (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Newmark & 
Witko, 2007), studies use also macroeconomic productivity indicators.  More specifically, 
Konisky and Woods (2012) assessed business interests as the share of state gross domestic 
product (GDP) generated by the manufacturing sector from each state based on total state-GDP.  
In this dissertation, business interests are measured as the state GDP generated by polluting 
industrial sectors as a share of total state GDP.  The sector-specific and state-total GDP estimates 
are calculated using data obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (BEA, 2018a).   
BEA defines GDP as “market value of goods and services produced by the labor and 
property located in a state.  GDP by state is the state counterpart to the national GDP, and it is 
“the Bureau's featured and most comprehensive measure of U.S. economic activity” (BEA, 
2018b).  These data are available for each of the states for each year.  A higher score on this 
variable is interpreted as a state having a greater level of business interests in the polluting 





and Woods (2012), Anderson (2011) observed additional sectors affected by environmental 
regulations thus also exert influence on environmental policy.   
Building upon Anderson’s (2011) research, the manufacturing and mining sectors were 
selected, because these sectors of the economy are those that “may be disproportionately 
burdened by environmental regulations”, since they have the greatest influence on state 
emissions of pollutant emissions (p. 553).  Additionally, given the impacts the utilities sector has 
on anthropogenic emissions, particularly emissions of CO2, that sector is added to produce a 
measure comprised of three sectors (Falke, 2011).  To provide a sufficiently, though not overly, 
expansive proxy of business interests, the measure was devised to incorporate the sectors of the 
economy with the greatest linkages to environmental pollution—in terms of emissions 
magnitude thus perceived regulatory burden—and to exclude those sectors which would not have 
an appreciable contribution (e.g. warehousing, publishing, professional services).  Values for 
business interests (BUSINT) are calculated with the following equation: 
𝐵𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑇 =  
(  )  (  )  (  )
(  )
                                                                     (3) 
Where BUSINTit is the proportion of GDP contributed by manufacturing, mining, and 
utilities from total GDP of the ith state in period t, 
GDPMFGit is the gross domestic product from the manufacturing sector of ith state in 
period t,  
GDPMNGit is the gross domestic product from the mining sector of ith state in period t,  
GDPUTLit is the gross domestic product from the utilities sector of ith state in period t, 
and 
GDPALLit is the gross domestic product from all polluting industrial sectors of ith state in 





3.3.3. Civic environmentalism. 
 Civic environmentalism reflects the extent to which the federal legislative delegation for 
a state is legitimating environmentally proactive policy based upon electoral preferences.  This 
indicator provides a score developed for each state by the LCV calculated from the 
environmental legislation voting records—roll call votes—of all members in Congress.  These 
scores “reflect the views of the environmental community in the US.  Votes coded as pro-
environmental by the LCV typically support “renewable energy, oppose nuclear power, 
encourage pollution abatement, and call for the conservation of wildlife and habitats” (Kim & 
Urpelainen, 2017).  Hays (2000) observed that environmental-preferences in civil society helped 
enhance the influence this voting segment had on attracting Congressional delegations of the 
states; that is, the political pressure these groups applied was key to their success at attracting the 
attention of, and action by, Congress.   
This measure is based on a ratio level of data calculated by the LCV, and is available for 
each of the years included in this study (LCV, 2018).  The scores are on a scale from 0 to 100 
and are calculated by dividing the total quantity of pro-environment votes cast by the total 
quantity of legislation scored by LCV for a given year as to their pro-environment content.  
Higher scores are interpreted as greater prevalence of civic environmentalism.  The following 
equation is used to calculate the values for civic environmentalism (CIVENV): 
𝐶𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑉 =  
(    )  (    )
( )
                                                   (4) 
Where CIVENVit is the civic environmentalism value of the ith state in period t, 
LCV Score-House is the LCV score for the lower-chamber of the legislature of the ith 
state in period t, and 





state in period t. 
The higher the value, the greater the level of civic environmentalism in a state.  It is 
posited that lower scores on this variable indicate there is either less awareness, and/or less 
electoral interest in environmental pollution.  This, in turn, results in downward pressure on 
demand for environmental spending by civil society.  As noted by Basu and Devaraj (2014), as 
environmental activism increases, however, these connections between pollution and impacts are 
recognized consequently leading to increased spending.  While there is a level of subjectivity 
inherent in processes such as that used by the LCV, the organization’s reliance on environmental 
and legal professionals to inform the scoring; resonance in the environmental policy scholarship; 
and given the transparency as to how the LCV develops their scoring, further justifies the use of 
the indicator as a measure of civic environmentalism.   
3.3.4. Climate policies.   
The variable represents the extent to which states have implemented mandatory policies 
to address climate change (i.e. climate policies) directed at reducing CO2 emissions from power 
plants—the largest single source of CO2 emissions in the US (Martin & Saikawa, 2017).   
Policies that affect the energy landscape, such as providing incentives for green technologies and 
voluntary policies that do not have formal compliance and enforcement mechanisms—which 
require state environmental agency programmatic and personnel support, thus funding—are 
excluded.  Since there is no mandatory CO2 emissions mitigation policy required at the federal-
level, the only mandatory requirements that are evaluated are state-level climate policies aimed 
at reducing CO2 emissions.  Table 7 provides a summary of the policies that will be measured 








Description of Climate Policies  
Name Policy Type Description 
Greenhouse Gas Targets   Climate 
Establishes targets for CO2 emission reductions within proscribed 
time periods 
Mandatory GHG Registry / 
Reporting 
Climate 
Requires power plants to register and record and report (i.e. 
inventory) their greenhouse gas emissions 
Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) 
Climate 
RGGI was the first US cap-and-trade program to reduce GHG 
emissions from the power sector 
Emissions Performance 
Standards 
Climate Performance standards designed to reduce CO2 emissions 
California Global 
Warming Solutions Act 
Climate 
Establishes mandatory requirements based on a cap-and-trade 
program to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 
Note.  From Martin & Saikawa (2017).    
Since the climate policy data are based on the year the policy was signed into law, to 
account for policy diffusion, the policy data, consistent with the other independent variables, are 
lagged by one year.  The climate policy variable, CLMTP, will be coded as follows:  
0 = Absence of Climate Policy for a State-year  
1 = Presence of Climate Policy for a State-year.    
The presence of a climate policy, does not necessarily correspond to the year the policy 
actually took effect given that environmental agencies require time between policy adoption and 
final regulatory implementation.  Assessing the appropriations after a one-year lag helps allow 
time for the budgeting process to reflect the programmatic and personnel needs for adequate 
compliance and enforcement of the climate policy.  This approach offers two benefits—first, it 
acknowledges previous findings that mandatory policies are more effective at reducing GHG 
emissions compared to voluntary requirements and, second, coding based on before-and-after 
adoption, provides “a standard that can be easily determined” (Martin & Saikawa, 2017, p. 918).  
To summarize, the climate policy dummy variable indicates the presence or absence of a climate 





was set to 0—pre-adoption—and to 1—post-adoption per Martin & Saikawa (2017) for 2010 - 
2014.  Climate policy data for 2015 was obtained through the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL, 2019), again based upon the policies described in Table 7.     
3.3.5. Partisan ideology. 
This variable is the identifiable ideology of a state legislature based on partisan, or party, 
identification as it relates to that party’s relative control over state government.   Partisan 
ideology does not have a definition that is universally consistent among the states.  As Heckman 
(2012) observed, “Democrats in Texas are more likely to be ideologically similar to Republicans 
in Massachusetts rather than Democrats [in Massachusetts]” (p. 483).  However, partisan 
ideology identification among elected officials may be expected to be more consistent than 
across the general population which is one possibility this way of conceptualizing the 
characteristic is commonly employed in the literature previously reviewed.  Furthermore, as 
revealed by the findings of McCright et al. (2014), notable differences in perceived national 
environmental spending exist between Democrats and Republicans that are congruent with 
differences between liberal and conservative respondents suggesting a similarity between 
partisan identity and political ideology.   
As King (1989) notes, the Ranney index is a measure of state-level partisanship.  The 
calculation of this variable is based on the partisan composition of the state government as a 
function of the governorship and both chambers of the state legislature and for each of the 50 
states in the US.  Based on the operationalization provided by Bose and Brower (2018), the 
indicator for this variable is based on the proportion of Democrat control of the upper and lower 
chambers of the state legislature; percentage vote for Democrat’s gubernatorial candidate; and a 





of the branches.  The scores could, hypothetically, range from 0 to 1.0 with higher scores on this 
variable indicative of a state being more Democrat-leaning than Republican-leaning in their 
overall partisan ideological preference for those in state elected office.  The following equation 
will be used to calculate the values for this measure of partisan ideology (PARTID): 
𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝐼𝐷 =  
((  )  )  (  ) ( )
( )
                                                   (5) 
Where PARTIDit is the partisan ideology value of the ith state in period t, 
DEMGVit is the percent vote for Democrat’s Candidate for Governor of the ith state in 
period t,  
DEMHSit is the percentage of Democrat party seats in the lower legislative chamber of 
the ith state in period t,  
DEMSNit is the percentage of Democrat party seats in the upper legislative chamber of 
the ith state in period t, and 
Controlit: is determined as follows: 
Democrats control house, senate, and governorship = 1 (i.e. 100%);  
Democrats control only some branches (i.e. divided control) = 0.5 (i.e. 50%); or         
Otherwise = 0 (i.e. 0%).   
 While the inclusion of this control dimension in the calculation of the Ranney index value 
for each state-year was not part of the original Ranney (1965) methodology, as King (1989) and 
Tucker (1982) describes further, it resolves multiple assumptions made in the original 
methodology.   
3.3.6. Legislative professionalization. 
This indicator provides a composite measure based on “legislative salary, staff, and time 





a state having a greater level of legislative professionalization.  Where data were either not 
available from the NCSL—(e.g. Alabama, Connecticut, and New Mexico)—or determined based 
on state-specific sources (e.g. California, Illinois) the developer of the index obtained data from 
multiple other sources further described in Squire (2017).   
There are three dimensions, or components, which form the basis of this index which are: 
compensation (member pay); time in session (total days in session); and staff resources (staff 
members per legislator).  Each state legislator score for each of these attributes is calculated as a 
percentage of the U.S. Congress score on the same attributes.  The average score for each state is 
then calculated from these three percentages which leads to a scale ranging from 0.0 to 1.0.  That 
is, the components, are all equally weighted.  A higher score is interpreted as a state having a 
greater total resemblance to the state delegation to the U.S. legislature—that is, a score closer to 
0.0 would represent very little consistency (i.e. U.S. Congress is used as the baseline).   
Based on Squire (2012) and Squire (2017), only values from 2009 and 2015 are actual 
discrete measurements for those state-years; therefore linear interpolation was used to calculate 
the values for the years in-between 2009 and 2015.  The following equations provide used to 
calculate the legislative professionalization (LEGISP) values for 2010 through 2014.   
𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃 = 1 ∗ 
((  )  (  ))
( )
  + 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃2009               (6) 
𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃 = 2 ∗ 
((  )  (  ))
( )
  + 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃2009           (7) 
𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃 = 3 ∗ 
((  )  (  ))
( )
  + 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃2009               (8) 
𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃 = 4 ∗ 
((  )  (  ))
( )
  + 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃2009               (9) 
𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑃 = 5 ∗ 
((  )  (  ))
( )





Where LEGISPi2010 is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in period 2010, 
LEGISP2015 i is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in 2015,  
LEGISP2009 i is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in 2009, 
LEGISPi2011 is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in period 
2011, 
LEGISPi2012 is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in period 
2012, 
LEGISPi2013 is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in period 
2013, and 
LEGISPi2014 is the legislative professionalization value of the ith state in period 
2014. 
3.3.7. Fiscal capacity. 
Anticipated revenue availability often frames budget deliberations throughout the 
preparation and legislative phases (Bland, 2007), thus revenue proxies such as state income are 
often used to guide budget policy.  In the academic literature, studies frequently operationalize 
fiscal capacity by wealth indicators, such as household income on either a total, or per capita 
basis (Hays et al., 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012).  Another way state fiscal capacity has been 
evaluated with respect to environmental agency funding is related to the ability of a state to raise 
revenue, for example, through taxation (Agthe et al., 1996; Lester, 1986).  However, issues have 
been raised with certain measures of fiscal capacity such as income tax.  For example, it has been 
estimated that less than 60 percent of capital gains are reported underscoring a need to explore 





While household income data has been used in public budgeting research for nearly 90 
years, from a measurement standpoint, it has been criticized as not adequately capturing fully the 
capacity states have to pay for services (Lee et al., 2013).  To address this challenge, fiscal 
capacity is measured using the total taxable resources (TTR) which provides a relative estimate 
of a state’s fiscal capacity based on the states’ gross product (i.e. goods and services) and income 
sources (U.S. Treasury, 2019).  This approach to measuring state fiscal capacity has not been 
used in prior research on state environmental appropriations.   
Originating from an analysis of national and subnational fiscal relations conducted in the 
late 1980s (U.S. Treasury, 1986), TTR is required to be calculated by the U.S. Treasury on an 
annual basis and is used to develop federal fund allocations to government functions including 
substance abuse and mental health services (U.S. Treasury, 2002).  The general purpose of the 
TTR is to provide an improvement over earlier related measures, such as the state personal 
income (SPI) over concerns that the latter measure did not reflect the ability of state governments 
to generate revenue in the provision of public services given its exclusion of: corporate retained 
profits, out-of-state resident revenues (e.g. dividend income), and earned income by residents in 
one state while living in another state (i.e. commuter income) (U.S. Treasury, 2002).  To help 
ensure that measures of revenue generating capacity took all income flows into account, the TTR 
was developed to provide “the unduplicated sum of the income flows produced within a state 
[Gross State Product] (GSP) and the income flows received by its residents (SPI) which a state 








Figure 13.   
Total Taxable Resources Estimation 
 
Note.  From U.S. Treasury (2002).   
3.3.8. State environmental agency budget policy. 
ECOS (2010) describes their approach to collecting environmental agency budget data 
from each respondent state—on a voluntary basis—as follows:  
When states provide “budget” numbers (instead of “actual expenditures”), they 
are listing the maximum possible expenditures for the agency. That is, such 
budgets are the optimum spending plan for the agency. It is quite possible that 
many states will be unable to generate enough revenue in 2011 to cover the 
expenditures laid out in their budgets. If that happens, the states will cut the 
general fund portion of the budgets during the fiscal year. Thus, the numbers we 
have are essentially the best case scenarios for state budgets. Such a scenario is 
very unlikely for EPA, as a comparison. Once Congress and the President have 





year. This is a major difference between states and the federal government in the 
manner in which environmental agency budgets are handled (p. 3). 
The functional classifications of environmental appropriations are key to selecting the 
appropriate measure.  For example, while natural resource spending, on its face, may appear 
virtually identical to environmental spending, the two, from a functional perspective, are quite 
different.  This is one reason why U.S. Census data on natural resource spending, while 
comprehensive and available for many years, was ultimately dismissed for use in this study.  
Many agencies contribute to more than a singular function, and any single agency is likely to 
contribute to a multitude of governmental functions; the data from ECOS addresses, at least 
partly, this functional classification challenge.   
While expenditures, or outlays, flow from an appropriations bill—both from the national 
and state governments—that provides the budget authority for the agency over a given fiscal 
year, agency spending is a function of appropriations made from multiple preceding years.  
Again, ECOS data are helpful regarding operationalization, since they represent the budget 
authority appropriated rather than expenditures for which a focus on the latter “…renders an 
inaccurate view of the cost of government” (Mikesell, 2018, p. 76).  The focus on appropriations, 
versus final expenditures—(e.g. obtained through state comprehensive annual financial 
reports)—has extensive currency in the public budgeting literature as observed by Smith and 
Bertozzi (1998).   
Environmental agency budgets are a combination of total revenue transfers from the 
federal government and own-source (i.e. state-source) revenues (e.g. raised through regulated 
community fees and transfers from the general funds).  Notably, ECOS (2017b) data do not 





environmental appropriations is for state governments to rely more on charges and fees over 
time, thus further justifying an empirical approach based on a disaggregated measure of state 
own-source funding.  While the benefits of regressing multiple dependent variables on identical 
predictors have been discussed elsewhere (Heckman, 2012), simply stated—what factors best 
explain state-source funding from fees and other sources may not necessarily explain state-
source funding from the general fund.   
Despite the incorporation of fiscal measures in previous research, the use of agency 
budget policy data in many studies is characterized by empirical limitations.  Instead of setting a 
robust research agenda, these prior analyses are inherently complicated by the “… paucity of 
reliably and continuously updated datasets that capture current state environmental policy efforts.  
This is not surprising, “given the laborious nature of collecting such information” (Konisky & 
Woods, 2012, p. 545).  Data for state environmental agency funding is not systematically tracked 
by the USEPA on a recurring basis, and it is only sporadically collected by private institutions 
(Environmental Integrity Project, 2019).  Accordingly, the datasets needed to measure the 
outcome variable are neither available for all years, nor for all states.  ECOS recently released 
state-level environmental agency spending data in September, 2012 and, again, in April, 2017.   
State environmental agency budget data represent the fiscal resources appropriated for 
each year included in this study—2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 (ECOS, 2017b). 
“This amount should not include funds for parks, natural resource management 
(e.g., forestry, fish and wildlife). The amount should include all delegated or 
authorized (e.g., RCRA) federal programs and related state programs that address 
air, water, drinking water, waste/land issues.  Only include programs within your 





programs for some states agencies and thus will not be fully captured by this 
budget update” (ECOS, 2017b, p. 39).   
This dataset of state environmental agency budgets is complete for the majority of states.  ECOS 
reported that data were not provided by Louisiana, North Carolina, New Jersey, and New 
Mexico.   
State-Source revenues.  State own-source funding of environmental agency budgets is a 
function of two discrete sources—general funds appropriated by each state legislature and from 
fees.  Of the state-source revenues, or funds, the majority are derived from fees and other 
sources with the remainder appropriated from the general operating funds of states’ treasuries—
so called general funds (ECOS, 2017b).  The state-source revenues generated by fees and other 
sources are categorized as either direct or indirect user fees.  Direct fees refer to those costs 
which are imposed through the traditional command-and-control regulatory schemes (e.g. Title 
V air permit program) and market-based approaches to pollution abatement (e.g. 1990 Clean Air 
Amendments which resulted in cap-and-trade for certain criteria pollutants).   
Direct fees are essentially charged to the regulated community due to the pollution firms 
(e.g. electric generating utilities, chemical plants) add to the environment as a result of market 
failure (Kraft & Furlong, 2015).  A certain portion of the direct fees are regulatory program fees 
that can be proportionate to either the magnitude of pollution emitted (e.g. air emissions fees), or 
to the agency’s administrative efforts to process non-recurring, or one-off, regulatory actions that 
require environmental agency review and issuance (e.g. air permit fees).  ECOS (2012) notes the 
majority of this portion of the budget is comprised of permit fees.  For example, under the Title 
V air program, the fee set by, and due payable to, the state government, is $51.06 per ton of 





treasury and helps fund the environmental agency’s administration of the program for current or 
out-year budget cycles.  That is, these fees—or user charges—are meant to cover all, or at least 
some portion, of the cost of providing the regulatory services and often vary based on the nature 
and complexity of the operation.  For example, the fee to build and permit a new large landfill in 
Oregon is $10,000 while the fee to permit a cranberry bog in Maine is $240 (Maine Department 
of Environmental Protection, 2018; Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, 2019).   
 3.4. Statistical Analysis Plan 
The initial stage of the analysis provides a brief descriptive analysis of state own-source 
appropriations to environmental agencies between 2011 and 2015.  In particular, state-source 
funding from fees and other sources and general funds are briefly summarized.  The remainder 
of this section refers to the regression analyses performed and additional details regarding the 
structure of the dataset that inform the various options for empirical analysis.   
Unlike with cross-sectional data which provide observations on states at the same period 
in time (i.e. for a particular year), a panel design—unbalanced panel specifically is used.  A 
panel data structure is generally preferred over cross-sectional data given the additional variation 
within the values of the variables due to the temporal dimension of the longitudinal data.  As 
mentioned previously, the independent variable data are lagged by one-year and matched to data 
on state environmental agency appropriations from 2011 to 2015.  This methodological approach 
allows assessment of the possible effects of factors in a given year on the environmental agency 
budget policy in the subsequent year for a national sample of states.   
While using a standard linear regression model with aggregate data was considered, it is 
ultimately not chosen as an estimation technique across all models.  Fitting such a model would 





one sample population.  This can be methodologically problematic given that, particularly in 
panel data, there can be, and often is, both variance between the states and variance within the 
states.  Put another way, that type of standard OLS estimation would not take into account the 
hierarchical structure of the dataset (Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2009).  Alternatively, fixed effect 
and random effect estimates in linear models provide estimation methods to account for: 
“clustering or dependence in a dataset, and differing relationships within and between clusters” 
(Bell, Fairbrother, & Jones, 2019, p. 1052).  Since this interdependence characterizes panel data, 
it is important to recognize there can be within effects (i.e. effects that occur within the states 
themselves) and between effects (i.e. effects that occur between the states).   
As previously mentioned, since not all 50 states responded to the budget survey, the 
sample size—in terms of state-year observations—is reduced to (n = 171) and (n = 183) for 
general funds and fees and other sources (ECOS, 2017b).  The smaller sample size makes 
research decisions regarding model specification particularly important given the nature of 
regression analysis.  Specifically, “there is a real danger of overfitting a model, building in 
component that really capture random variation, rather than systematic regularities in behavior" 
(Menard, 2002, p. 90).  Additionally, running the models with lagged values for the independent 
variables can help to alleviate the concern of endogeneity.   
As Figure 14 depicts, moderation analysis (i.e. multiplicative interaction) is quite similar 
to a statistical model that does not include a moderator.  One of the challenges with developing a 
conceptual model for a study is balancing the need to provide a representation of reality that is 
not so complex so as to challenge the empirical models used to estimate the hypothesized effects 
(Fisher-Owens et al., 2007).  No doubt there are other conceptual models that can be proposed—





conceptual model that follows in Figure 14 attempts to capture the complexity of associated 
relationships while acknowledging it is not representative of the full gamut of causal 
relationships, contingencies, and intervening processes. 
Figure 14.   
Conceptual Model of Dissertation (Indicating Moderation by Business Interests) 
 
The analysis includes four regression models given the two pollution metrics (e.g. criteria 
air pollution severity index and CO2 emissions) and the two sources of state own-source funding 
(e.g. fees & other sources and general funds).  This approach permits an exploratory examination 
of the influence of fiscal, legal, institutional, and political factors on fees and other sources or on 
general funds.  The following table describes the four models; identifies the two dependent 









Table 8. Regression Models with Interaction Terms 
 Overall Model & Interaction Terms  Overall Model & Interaction Terms 
DV 
Funding  
(Fees & Other Sources) 
DV 
Funding 
(General Fund Appropriations) 
Model 1 
Criteria Air Pollution* Business 
Interests 
Model 3 
Criteria Air Pollution * Business 
Interests 
Model 2 CO2 Emissions * Business Interests Model 4 CO2 Emissions * Business Interests 
 
Equation 11 provides the functional equation to estimate appropriations.   
Agency Budget it = ß0 + ß1X1+ ß2X2 + ß3 (X1* X2) + ß4X4 + ß5X5 + ß6X6 + ß7X7 + ß8X8 + ß9X9 + ß10X10 + ε    
                            (11) 
Where, for each application of the model, Agency Budget it represents the environmental agency 
appropriations for state i in year t, and 
ß0 = [least squares estimate of] the Y-intercept or what the environmental agency budget 
would be if all the scores (i.e. values) of the variables of interest were equal to 0, 
ß1 = regression coefficient, or slope of regression line, of the environmental pollution 
metric—the first constitutive term, 
ß2 = the coefficient on the regression term of the moderator—the second constitutive 
term, 
ß3  = coefficient on the interaction term,  
ß4, ß5, ß6, ß7, ß8, ß9, ß10 = regression coefficients, or slopes, for: fiscal capacity; partisan 
ideology; civic environmentalism; climate policies; legislative professionalization; 
federal-source funding; population); and  
ε = Expresses difference between the value of the actual appropriations and the 





3.4.1. Interpreting regression coefficients. 
The regression coefficient of either environmental pollution metric (i.e. criteria air 
pollution or CO2 emissions), represents the first constitutive term of the subsequent interaction 
term.  Since this coefficient is for a constitutive term, it is not directly interpretable as a direct 
effect (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006; Hayes, 2018).  Similarly, the coefficient on the 
regression term of the moderator (i.e. the second constitutive term after ß1 also is not interpreted 
as a main effect.  That is, ß2 estimates the effect of business interests on budgets when pollution 
is 0, and the coefficient, ß1, estimates the effect of pollution on budgets when business interests 
is 0.  Since a value of zero for either variable is not within the bounds of the datasets, the 
aforementioned coefficients are not interpretable.  The remaining regression coefficients (i.e. ß4, 
ß5, ß6, ß7, ß8, ß9, ß10) reflect the magnitude environmental agency appropriations go up, or down, 
(i.e. main effects) for each additional unit increase in that variable of interest (e.g. fiscal capacity; 
partisan ideology; civic environmentalism; climate policies; legislative professionalization; 
federal-source funding; and population).   
Similar to the regression coefficient of ß1 and ß2, the coefficient on the interaction term, 
ß3, is also not directly interpretable from the magnitude and statistical significance of the 
coefficient.  The marginal effect of pollution on agency budgets could be statistically significant 
across reasonable, or practical, values of business interests even absent a statistically significant 
coefficient on the interaction term (Brambor et al., 2006).  Conditional marginal effects graphs 
are developed to ascertain—and visualize—the relevant range of the marginal effect, if any, of 
the modifying variable that is statistically significant (i.e. to visualize the reductive effect of 
business interests on the relationship between pollution and agency budgets).  This is exhibited 





below) the zero line” (Brambor et al., 2006, p. 76).  The results will be examined, for example, to 
evaluate the range of moderator values for which the relationship between pollution and budgets 
is statistically significant by constructing confidence bands around the slopes (Dawson, 2014).   
Since the scores of the indicators used to operationalize the concepts may have too high a 
correlation with each other to offer statistical utility in the regression analysis, multicollinearity 
will be evaluated.  While “high multicollinearity does not cause bias… it increases standard 
errors and so can cause overlap in the estimator for highly correlated variables that have similar 
coefficient magnitudes” (Al-Kohlani & Campbell, 2016, p. 482).  The correlations between 
variable pairs are examined prior to regression analysis.  In addition, assumptions related to 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are evaluated to assess whether scores on the dependent 
variable exhibit a fairly uniform distribution across all levels of the predictor variables scores 
and between panels.  Moreover, details regarding the results of data screening and data 
transformations are summarized in Chapter 4.   
 3.4.2. Advantages & limitations of the design & statistical analysis plan. 
 While regression analysis provides advantages over analyzing bivariate relationships, 
there are certain limitations that deserve mentioning.  Though the ECOS data represent a 
comprehensive source of state environmental budget data, this analysis could benefit from a 
longer panel of historical data.  The lack of a robust collection of time series data has been a long 
standing challenge in state environmental policy research (Lester & Lombard, 1990).  The panel 
data structure is, however, preferred for econometric analysis when compared to either cross-
sectional (i.e. a data structure with multiple states over a single year), or time-series (i.e. a data 





In terms of whether, or not, the endogenous variable—appropriations—that is regressed 
onto the independent variables, comes before, or after (i.e. is the cause or effect) in the model, 
there is no test that would definitively rule-out such a possibility.  The causal relationship 
underpinning the hypotheses is rooted in theory and from existing scholarship regarding the 
expected associations between budgetary predictors and budget policy reviewed in Chapter 2.  
Kennedy (2008) provides further discussion of endogenous variables and their modeling 
including various types of endogeneity.     
Due to the multi-dimensional nature of budgetary preferences, the key variables proposed 
in this study do not capture the entirety of all determinants that may be related to state 
environmental agency budgets.  Since this dissertation proposes the use of indicators to 
empirically assess attributes that characterize concepts, construct validity is limited to the extent 
these measures fall short of measuring the concepts (Gerring, 2015).  If the construct validity is 
low, it would serve to limit the “real-life applicability” of the findings and to make “valid 
research claims” based on any findings (Gorard, 2013, p. 159).  These variables, and their 
indicators, were selected based on their face validity.   
Analyzing agency funding as the consequent variable is not without criticism.  For 
example, researchers have pointed-out that using funding as the outcome variable biases the 
researcher to select input variables that are also economically-based; therefore, they appear on 
both sides of the equation (Lester & Lombard, 1990); this can increase the risk of committing a 
Type I error.  This is a concern from both a theoretical and methodological perspective, thus to 
minimize the impact from this potential weakness, no variables are proposed in this analysis, 
other than one antecedent—fiscal capacity—and one control—federal-source appropriations—as 





The measure of climate policies does not take into account the stringency of the policy in 
terms of the expected magnitude with which it will be successful in reducing GHG emissions 
(i.e. not all policies will be equivalent in their effectiveness in reducing emissions).  A 
dichotomous measure for this concept does not capture whether states have multiple mandatory 
CO2 mitigation requirements in-place, or only one policy.  Presumably, states that have more 
than one policy, program in-place would be appropriating more than states with less.  Moreover, 
given the short timeframe of this analysis relative to public policymaking timelines, the values 
for this variable are time invariant meaning they will be dropped in a fixed effects model—a 
limitation which is addressed further in Chapter 4.   
Lastly, and related to the above weakness, “the problem with fiscal policy is its slowness” 
(Mikesell, 2018, p. 18).  While the source of appropriations data for this dissertation was made 
after considering data from the U.S. Census; state comprehensive annual financial reports; and 
individual budget documents, it could be the short panel of data provided from ECOS does not 
fully accommodate the policy diffusion process.  Combined with budget data from subsequent 
periods, a longer panel (e.g. over 10 years, or more) could enable analysis of the extent to which 
environmental agency budgets have responded, fiscally, to the promulgation of mandatory 









Chapter 4: Results & Findings 
 This chapter provides the empirical models, results, and findings.  The first section 
revisits the research questions and hypotheses and provides the conceptual model.  The second 
section provides a brief descriptive analysis of state environmental agency appropriations during 
the study period followed by key details regarding data screening.  The final section provides the 
estimation of linear models using fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) techniques; the 
regression results; and concludes with findings.   
 4.1. Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Conceptual Model 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the dependent variable is state own-source 
appropriations to state environmental agencies disaggregated into two measures—fees and other 
sources and general funds.  Table 9 reviews each hypothesis and research question to which each 
hypothesis aligns.   
Table 9 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Questions Hypotheses 
Does the influence of air pollution on 
state environmental appropriations vary 
according to the magnitude of polluting 
business interests? 
H1: Air pollution severity will increase environmental 
agency budgets, if levels of polluting business interests of 
states are sufficiently low. 
What are the effects of political, 
institutional, fiscal, and legal factors on 
state own-source appropriations to state 
environmental agencies and do the 
effects vary based on the funding source 
or air pollutant type? 
H2: Civic environmentalism will have a positive influence 
on environmental agency budgets. 
H3: Mandatory climate policies will have a positive 
influence on environmental agency budgets. 
H4: Legislative professionalization will have a positive 
influence on environmental agency budgets. 
H5: Liberal ideology will have a positive influence on 
environmental agency budgets. 
H6: State fiscal capacity will have a positive influence on 






 4.2. Environmental Agency Budget Patterns 
Disaggregating the dependent variable takes into account the budgetary reality that less-
and-less funds flow from the federal government to state environmental agencies and that permit 
fees, emissions charges, and registration fees provide an ever-increasing component of state 
own-source funding.  For both this pattern analysis, and the regression analyses that follow, the 
state and local government price index values were used to deflate the budget data from BEA’s 
National Income and Products Account datasets; the default base year for these data is 2012 
(BEA, 2019).  By converting the appropriations, as well as the values for the TTR variable, from 
nominal to real dollars, the influence that inflation could have on the results is removed.  
Figure 15.  
State Environmental Agency Budgets, 2011 - 2015 
 
Note.  Compiled by author from ECOS (2012; 2017b) data. 
 
Between 2011 and 2015, the proportion of state environmental appropriations derived 
from state own-source funding ranged from 70%, in 2011, to over 80%, by 2015 with the 





fund appropriations.  On average, of the state-source funding, fees and other sources comprise 
over 60% during this period.  The proportion of environmental appropriations from the federal 
government declined from a high of nearly 30%, in 2011, to just above 18% in 2015—a 
percentage decrease of over 10%.  Figure 15 provides a line chart depicting the pattern of 
increasing state-source funding and declining federal-source funding over the same period.  
Overall, states are continuing to draw more from state-sources of revenue in the absence of 
federal-source funding.  These findings are consistent with ECOS (2017b)—the source of the 
2013 through 2015 agency budget data—which noted a marked increase in fees and other 
sources and the concurrent decline in federal funding due to stagnant grant funding to states from 
the USEPA.    
Further, the patterns apparent in the budget dataset used in this dissertation are consistent 
with previous observations in the academic literature.  For example, Davis and Lester (1987) 
found that states augmented their budget policies (i.e. increased environmental agency funding) 
when federal-source allocations were reduced.  Specifically, they found that “a third to one half 
of the states have replaced or will replace federal budget cuts with state-generated revenues 
within the foreseeable future, although this number could easily increase as the result of well 
publicized “environmental crises” (Davis & Lester, 1987, p. 563).  Wood (1991) also found that 
agencies sought out additional funding from their state legislators when federal source funds 
declined.  Thus, the findings are consistent with previous scholarship.   
 4.3. Preliminary Data Analysis 
To begin, the panel data structure allows me to aggregate budget data from the states at 
the environmental agency level and estimate coefficients on the regression and interaction terms 





inspected visually through the use of histograms, scatterplots, and boxplots which suggested the 
presence of extreme, and missing, values requiring further examination and screening prior to 
empirical analysis.   
4.3.1. Extreme values. 
To identify extreme values, upper and lower bounds are calculated using the interquartile 
range (IQR) (i.e. the difference between the first and third quartiles) using the Tukey fences 
approach (Hoaglin, 2003).  The first quartile is calculated to identify the 25% of data that are 
below the first quartile then the third quartile is calculated in the same manner for the 25% of 
data that are above the third quartile.  The IQR is calculated and used to identify extreme values 
either below the first quartile, or above the third quartile.  Extreme values were detected for all 
variables except civic environmentalism, and the values were associated with California, New 
York, and Texas—consistent with expectations given the unique features of these states (e.g. 
large populations, high levels of economic activity, significant pollution).  No values were 
dropped from the dataset, since all outliers were found to be true values after accounting for data 
entry errors.  Further, logarithmic transformation helped eliminate the influence outliers could 
have on estimating coefficients especially given the small sample size (Warner, 2013).   
4.3.2. Missing data. 
As noted in Chapter 3, there were several data points missing from the ECOS datasets as 
well as some states that reported receiving no appropriations from the state general fund for 
certain years.  Tables 10 and 11 provide the details in the reduction of state-years as a result of 
states either not reporting appropriations data, or reporting zero funds received from general fund 





Table 10: Non-Reported State-Years 
 
 Year Total 
State 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
Florida X X X   
Iowa X X X   
Louisiana    X X X 
North Carolina   X X X 
New Jersey   X X X 
New Mexico X X X X X 
Total 3 3 6 4 4 20 
 
Table 11: State-Years with Zero Appropriations from General Fund 
 
 Year Total 
State 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
Arizona   X X X 
Illinois X X X X X 
Louisiana X     
Nevada X X X X X 
Ohio   X   
Total 3 2 4 3 3 15 
 
4.3.3. Correlational analysis. 
 A correlational analysis was performed to examine the linear association between values 
of each of the independent variables which resulted in dropping population given its extremely 
high correlation (above 0.9) with fiscal capacity (Berry, 1993).  The correlations of civic 
environmentalism and legislative professionalization were also elevated which was further 
inspected with collinearity diagnostics leading to the retention of both variables as they were 
well below the commonly cited variance inflation factor of 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & 
Black, 1995).  Regardless of their inclusion in the models, it is acknowledged that these elevated 
bivariate correlations suggest the values for both civic environmentalism and legislative 
professionalization could be providing redundant information about environmental agency 





correlational analyses, with CO2 emissions replacing criteria air pollution, were similar; 
therefore, Table 12 reports those correlations inclusive of only the criteria air pollutant index. 
Table 12. Zero-Order Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Criteria Air Pollution Index (1) 1.0         
Real Fiscal Capacity (2) .60 1.0        
Population (3) .66 .99 1.0       
Partisan Ideology (4) -.26 .19 .12 1.0      
Business Interests (5) .38 -.11 -.07 -.49 1.0     
Climate Policies (6) -.22 .21 .16 .61 -.49 1.0    
Civic Environmentalism (7) -.27 .17 .11 .78 -.58 .82 1.0   
Legislative Professionalism (8) .37 .74 .72 .35 -.22 .36 .35 1.0  
Real Budget – Federal Source (9) .27 .61 .62 .21 -.18 .20 .18 .61 1.0 
Notes.  Population highly correlated with fiscal capacity; fiscal capacity will control for the influence of state size 
 
4.4. Empirical Models 
The analysis plan and deductive research design involves a total of four empirical models 
given the two sources of state own-source funding and two measures of pollution severity.  This 
approach permits an examination of whether the overall influence of the fiscal, legal, 
institutional, and political factors on overall state own-source appropriations is attributable to an 
influence on fees and other sources or on general fund appropriations while taking into account 
pollution problems caused by either criteria air pollutants, or greenhouse gases.  The following 
Table 13 describes the four models. 
Table 13. Regression Models with Interaction Terms 
 Overall Model & Interaction Terms  Overall Model & Interaction Terms 
DV 
Funding  
(Fees & Other Sources) 
DV 
Funding 
(General Fund Appropriations) 
Model 1 
Criteria Air Pollution* Business 
Interests 
Model 3 
Criteria Air Pollution * Business 
Interests 






Each of the four econometric models within Table 13 follows the same regression equation to 
estimate the appropriations provided per Equation 12.  The variable description for each variable 
label in Equation 12 is provided below in Table 14.   
Agency Budget it = ß0 + ß1(Pollution) + ß2(BUSINT) + ß3(Pollution*BUSINT) +                (12)  
ß4(FISCAP) + ß5(PARTID) + ß6 (CIVENV) + ß7 (CLMTP) + ß8(LEGISP) + ß9(EABF) + ε       
Table 14. Variable Information for Environmental Agency Budget Policy Estimation  
Variable Description & Unit of Measure 
EABFO State-source appropriations derived from fees and other sources (US$M)  
EABGF State-source appropriations derived from general fund sources in (US$M)  
CAPSIDX Air emissions measured by the criteria air pollution severity index  
CO2Em Emissions of CO2 
BUSINT 
Business interests measured by proportion of GDP contributed by manufacturing, 
mining, utilities of total of state GDP  
PARTID Partisan ideological preference for state elected officials measured by Ranney Index  
FISCAP Fiscal capacity measured by TTR  
CIVENV Civic environmentalism measured by LCV scores 
CLMTP Policies to address climate change through CO2 emissions mitigation  
LEGISP Institutional capacity of state legislature measured by Squire Index  
EABF State-source appropriations derived from federal fund revenues in (US$M) 
Notes.  All fiscal variables, and CO2Em, were log transformed using the natural log (ln) to address extreme values 
and obtain normal distributions.  For climate policies, the value for each state was set to 0—pre-adoption—and to 
1—post-adoption per Martin & Saikawa (2017) for 2010 - 2014.  Climate policy data for 2015 was obtained through 
the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, 2019).  All financial data (e.g. EABFO, EABGF, FISCAP, 
and EABF) were converted to constant (base-year 2012) dollars.   
 
There are many ways to contemplate, and empirically investigate budgetary determinants 
on appropriations.  The challenge is to develop conceptual and empirical models that are realistic 
while having a feasible scope—models that are not either overly simplistic, or too complex so as 





as that “middle path, one that is comprehensible yet sophisticated enough to add value” (Fisher-
Owens et al., 2007, p. 516).   
4.4.1. Model 1. Criteria air pollution & fees and other sources. 
Prior to running diagnostics to determine whether a fixed-effects (FE) or random-effects 
(RE) model is the preferred technique for estimation of the linear model, two tests were 
performed to test for the existence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, respectively.  To 
examine whether the structure of the dataset would lead to biased results due to less efficient 
parameter estimates, the Wooldridge test for serial correlation was run wherein the null 
hypothesis is no serial correlation (Drukker, 2001).  The null hypothesis of no serial correlation 
is rejected suggesting there is correlation between the values of the variables over time; 
therefore, further attention is given to ensure the preferred model is used to produce consistent 
estimates.  More specifically, this finding—which is not surprising given the longitudinal nature 
of the dataset—suggests the use of a regression model to fit panel data with either a random or 
fixed-effects model (i.e. a panel technique).   
Another assumption of the regression modeling is the distribution of variable values 
predicted by the model (i.e. predicted values) is relatively constant across the range of residuals 
(Stock & Watson, 2003).  The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test is the residuals are 
homoscedastic (i.e. no heteroscedasticity) (Breusch-Pagan, 1980).  Upon running the test, the 
null hypothesis of constant variance is rejected suggesting there is evidence of heteroscedasticity 
in Model 1.  Along with the serial correlation, this heteroscedasticity will be accommodated 
using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Stock & Watson, 2003).              
Per Wooldridge (2002), based on the panel structure of the dataset, it is possible to 





characteristics that could vary over time.  To determine whether a FE or RE model was 
preferred, a Hausman test is run where, under the null hypothesis, individual effects are random 
(i.e. the RE model is preferred).  Though use of the Hausman test to decide on whether a FE or 
RE model provides the preferred specification of data is not without its criticism (Bell et al., 
2019), it is applied in this study given currency in the econometrics literature (Greene, 2012; 
Wooldridge, 2002).  More on these two estimation techniques is discussed in section 4.4.3.   
In all four models, there are eight continuous independent variables and one 
categorical—binary—independent variable which is time invariant (i.e. it stays constant 
throughout all five years).  The results of the Hausman test for fixed effects for Model 1 suggests 
the linear model should be estimated with fixed (within model) effects regression (i.e. prob>chi2 
was significant (i.e. p < 0.05) to improve the goodness-of-fit.  The FE estimation method for 
Model 1 recognizes the panel structure of the dataset by not considering all observations 
independent from one another.  Per Cameron & Trivedi (2009), given that the within standard 
deviation of climate policies is zero (i.e. it is time invariant), this variable is not carried forward 
as one of the regressors in the FE model.  That is, since this FE model will fix, or control-out, the 
average effects of the states, these results of Model 1 do not provide an indication as to the 
influence climate policies has, or not, on environmental appropriations.   
Given the inclusion of climate policies among my research hypotheses, however, 
standard ordinary least squares (OLS), with robust standard errors, was also used to estimate 
Model 1.  Given that standard (i.e. pooled) OLS treats all observations as independent, this 
estimation method fails to account for the panel structure of the dataset.  Further, this estimation 
method leads to regression coefficient estimates that are a weighted average of the within and 





significance will be detected (i.e. it increasing Type I error) (Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2009).  
Given these limitations, while the results from the OLS estimation method are provided in Table 
17, a brief discussion of only the climate policy variable accompanies the empirical results 
following the results of the FE model provided in Table 16.  Summary statistics for 
untransformed variables are now reported in Table 15.  
Table 15. Summary Statistics      
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Real Budget – Fees & Other 
(millions $) 
233 168.12 397.34 0 4137.26 
Real Budget – General Fund 
(millions $) 
233 27.10 38.90 0 270.78 
Criteria Air Pollution Index  250 0.04 4.86 -5.60 20.63 
CO2 Emissions  250 1.43e+11 1.51e+11 2.43e+09 1.00e+12 
Real Fiscal Capacity (millions $) 250 350,997 421,533 31,267 2,437,219 
Population (millions) 250 6.26 6.97 0.56 38.79 
Partisan Ideology 250 0.45 0.20 0.12 0.85 
Business Interests 250 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.41 
Climate Policies 250 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Civic Environmentalism  250 48.00 28.46 1 100 
Legislative Professionalism 250 0.21 0.11 0.04 0.62 
Real Budget – Federal Source 
(millions $) 
233 61.73 72.88 0 415.79 
Notes. All independent variables except Ranney Index, Business Interests, and Population are logged in the models.  
The descriptive statistics above pertain to the estimated parameters in all models.     
 
 Regarding the FE regression of Model 1 listed in Table 16—as predicted by technocracy 
theory—absent any influence by business interests, there is evidence criteria air pollution has a 
positive relationship with environmental budgets.  In other words, pollution from criteria air 
pollutants positively influences appropriations derived from fees and other sources when there is 





However, this coefficient is not directly interpretable, since it is describing the influence of 
pollution on appropriations at levels of business interests not within the range of the dataset (i.e. 
business interests = 0) (Braumoeller, 2004).  Therefore, to gain further insight into the interaction 
effect, the conditional marginal effect of criteria air pollution on appropriations is provided in 
Table 18.   
Contrary to expectations, no other coefficients on the regression terms, in the FE model, 
were statistically significant at either the 0.10, or the 0.05 significance level (p < 0.1, p < 0.05).  
From this model, there is insufficient evidence that fiscal capacity, partisan ideology, civic 
environmentalism, or legislative professionalization have a significant, direct, influence (i.e. 
main effect) on appropriations from fees and other sources.  In regards to the control variable, 
federal-source appropriations to environmental agencies are not found to increase, or decrease, 
budgets derived from fees and other sources.  While the climate policies variable is dropped from 
the FE results, the results estimated by the OLS regression model, as shown in Table 17, provide 
evidence that climate policies positively influence environmental appropriations.  This result 
suggests that environmental budgets are higher in response to the quantity of mandatory climate 
policies, as hypothesized.  Also as expected, the standard errors estimated by the OLS model are 

















Table 16. Fixed-effects Estimates for Appropriations from Fees & Other Sources (Criteria Air 
Pollution) (Model 1) 
 
Variable Coefficient Robust Standard 
Error 
t P>|t| 
CAPSIDX 0.20** 0.09 2.24 0.030 
FISCAP -0.50 0.56 -0.90 0.371 
PARTID 0.28 0.41 0.68 0.499 
BUSINT -0.71 3.19 -0.22 0.825 
CAPSIDX * BUSINT -0.76* 0.39 -1.95 0.057 
CIVENV -0.08 0.09 -0.90 0.374 
LEGISP -0.58 1.10 -0.53 0.600 
EABF  -0.01 0.03 -0.51 0.613 
Constant 10.96 6.57 1.67 0.101 
Observations = 183     
Groups (States) = 49     
R-squared (overall) = 0.37     
R-squared (within) = 0.06     
R-squared (between) = 0.37       
F (8,48) = 1.81     
Prob>F = 0.099     
rho = 0.97     
Fixed year effects; Independent variables are lagged 






















CAPSIDX 0.11** 0.04 2.57 0.011 
FISCAP 0.41*** 0.12 3.51 0.001 
PARTID 1.59*** 0.40 4.03 <0.001 
BUSINT -1.12 0.95 -1.17 0.243 
CAPSIDX * BUSINT -0.16 0.16 -1.02 0.311 
CLMTP 0.32** 0.16 2.01 0.046 
CIVENV -0.13 0.11 -1.19 0.235 
LEGISP -0.33 0.75 -0.43 0.664 
EABF 0.44*** 0.10 4.51 <0.001 
Constant -2.52 1.55 -1.62 0.107 
Observations = 183     
R-squared = 0.71     
F (9, 173) = 61.52     
Prob>F = 0.0000     
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Returning to the Model 1 results estimated from the FE model, these findings could be 
explained by the duration it takes for budgetary determinants to diffuse through the budgeting 
process.  Put another way, the short panel analyzed in this study—five years for the lagged 
independent variables—may not be sufficient time for any characteristic but the most impactful 
forces (i.e. business interests from polluting sectors) to affect appropriations from fees and other 
sources.  Alternatively, it could be that environmental agency budgeting, similar to that of many 
governmental agencies, is best characterized as incremental with either minimal increases, or 
minimal decreases, over the years and throughout the states.   
While the coefficient on the interaction term (CAPSIDX*BUSINT) provides evidence of 
statistically significant—and negative—interaction of business interests and criteria air pollution 





interpreting this coefficient in isolation (Brambor et al., 2006).  Since the coefficient on 
(CAPSIDX*BUSINT) is negative, this suggests that the reductive effect increases as the 
prevalence of business interests increases.  To better visualize the impact of criteria air pollution 
on appropriations along the business interests continuum, multiple marginal effects points were 
calculated to create a graph using business interests values ranging between 0.01 and 0.41—the 
minimum and maximum values—calculated in increments of 0.02.  Figure 16 provides a graph 
wherein the solid sloping line reflects how the marginal effect of criteria air pollution on 
appropriations is impacted by business interest conditions.  The confidence intervals depicted by 
the bands around the sloping line allows visualization of when interaction of business interests 


















Figure 16.   
Marginal Effects of Increased Business Interests on Criteria Air Pollution and Appropriations 
from Fees & Other Sources (Model 1) 
 
Note. A statistically significant effect is represented whenever the sloping line is within the confidence intervals 
where both the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval do not contain zero.  
 
When the marginal effect of criteria air pollution on appropriations from fees and other 
sources is viewed across a range of business interests found among the states, the negative 
interaction effect of business interests becomes clearer.  As shown in Figure 16, the results from 
Model 1 provides evidence of increased environmental budgets from fees and other sources 
when criteria air pollution increases in low-to-moderate business interests conditions.  The 
statistical significance, however, of this reductive effect on fees and other sources diminishes as 
these interests increase.  That is, at higher levels of business interests, the reductive effect of 
business interests on appropriations in response to criteria air pollution still increases though 





interests is greater than approximately 0.17, the moderation of business interests is no longer 
statistically significant.  When considered in the context of the business interest values across the 
sample population, roughly 60% of business interests values throughout the states fell within this 
region of significance.   
Table 18 provides the marginal effects of the criteria air pollution on appropriations from 
fees and other sources at varying percentiles of business interests. 
Table 18. Marginal Effect of Criteria Air Pollution on Appropriations from Fees & Other 
Sources (Model 1) 
Percentiles of 
BUSINT 




1% 0.046918 5.03 0.029 0.016614 
5% 0.073185 4.96 0.031 0.014623 
10% 0.083878 4.90 0.032 0.013812 
25% 0.123188 4.44 0.040 0.010832 
50% 0.157073 3.52 0.067 0.008264 
75% 0.208116 1.25 0.269 0.004395 
90% 0.265409 0.00 0.991 0.000052 
95% 0.311202 0.37 0.544 -0.003419 
Note. The marginal effect = coefficient of CAPSIDX*unit change of CAPSIDX+coefficient of the interaction 
term*unit change of CAPSIDX*BUSINT 
 
Based on Table 18, the statistically significant marginal effect of criteria air pollution 
severity on appropriations is evident as well as the limited magnitude of the positive effect.  For 
example, for a state that falls in the fiftieth percentile of BUSINT (0.157073), the marginal effect 
of a one standard deviation increase of BUSINT on EABFO is 0.1*0.2017-
0.7580*0.1*0.157073=0.008 million dollars, or roughly $10,000.  What also comes across from 
these results, though not statistically significant, is while there is a positive marginal effect, this 





Though the magnitude of the conditional marginal effect is not substantial, the results 
presented in Figure 16 and Tables 16 and 18 provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.  
Criteria air pollution does appear to increase environmental agency budgets across the states, and 
this positive marginal effect is evidenced not only at low levels of business interests but also at 
the mid-range.  Moreover, a reductive effect by business interests on states’ fiscal responsiveness 
to criteria air pollution is observed at the high-end of the business interest spectrum though this 
interaction effect eventually loses statistical significance.   
4.4.2. Model 2. CO2 Emissions & fees and other sources. 
Prior to running diagnostics to determine whether a FE or RE model is the preferred 
technique for estimating the linear model, two tests were performed to test for the existence of 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, respectively.  Results from the Wooldridge test for 
serial correlation supported rejecting the null hypothesis suggesting the variables are correlated 
over time for the sample of states.  The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test (i.e. no 
heteroscedasticity) is also rejected suggesting that there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in 
model one.  Similar to Model 1, along with the serial correlation, this heteroscedasticity will be 
accommodated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Stock & Watson, 2003).  Finally, 
results from the Hausman test suggests a FE model is preferred.    
The results of the FE regression of Model 2 are listed in Table 19.  Contrary to 
expectations, none of the regression terms prove to approach statistical significance, and the 
direction of many of the coefficients are inconsistent with the respective hypothesis.  For 
example, the coefficient on the focal independent variable in the model, CO2 emissions, is 
negative suggesting that as CO2 emissions increase, there is a negative influence on 





the sensitivity of model results to outliers, the model was re-run by removing these values, and 
this resulted in no noticeable impact on the estimates.  Compared to the Model 1 results, which 
suggest criteria air pollution problems tends to positively influence the appropriations derived 
from fees and other sources in accommodative business interest conditions, no such influence 
emerges with GHG pollution problems.  Since the main effect of carbon emissions is not 
specifically being tested, and it is describing the influence of carbon pollution on appropriations 
at zero level of business interests, the conditional marginal effect of carbon pollution on 
appropriations is separately examined.   
No other coefficients on the regression terms are statistically significant at either the 0.10, 
or the 0.05 significance level (p < 0.1, p < 0.05).  From this model, there is insufficient evidence 
that fiscal capacity, partisan ideology, civic environmentalism, or legislative professionalization 
have a significant, direct, influence (i.e. main effect) on appropriations from fees and other 
sources.  In regards to the control variable—federal-source appropriations to environmental 
agencies—similar to Model 1, this variable does not explain the variation in budgets.    
 Similar to Model 1, given the inclusion of the time invariant variable—climate policies—
among my research hypotheses and preference indicated for a FE model, estimation of Model 2 
was completed using an OLS model with robust standard errors.  The results from the OLS 
estimation method are provided in Table 20, a brief discussion of only the climate policy variable 
accompanies the empirical results following the results of the FE model provided in Table 19.  
While the climate policies variable is dropped from the FE results, the results estimated by the 
standard OLS regression model, as shown in Table 20, do not provide evidence that climate 





environmental budgets derived from fees and other sources do not exhibit fiscal responsiveness 
to the quantity of mandatory climate policies when the model is specified with CO2 emissions.     
Table 19. Fixed-effects Estimates for Appropriations from Fees & Other Sources (CO2 





CO2EM -0.05 0.25 -0.21 0.836 
FISCAP -0.29 0.67 -0.43 0.673 
PARTID -0.04 0.27 -0.14 0.885 
BUSINT -2.81 22.01 -0.13 0.899 
CO2EM * BUSINT 0.10 0.85 0.12 0.903 
CIVENV -0.07 0.08 -0.83 0.413 
LEGISP -0.74 1.24 -0.59 0.555 
EABF  -0.02 0.03 -0.65 0.516 
Constant 9.56 9.80 0.97 0.335 
Observations = 183     
Groups (States) = 49     
R-squared (overall) = 0.58     
R-squared (within) = 0.01     
R-squared (between) = 0.58       
F (8,48) = 0.60     
Prob>F = 0.78     
rho = 0.97     
Fixed year effects; Independent variables are lagged 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 


















CO2EM 0.08 0.25 0.31 0.754 
FISCAP 0.57*** 0.17 3.30 0.001 
PARTID 0.22 0.40 0.55 0.583 
BUSINT 80.59*** 28.24 2.85 0.005 
CO2EM * BUSINT -3.10*** 1.14 -2.72 0.007 
CLMTP 0.05 0.30 0.17 0.868 
CIVENV -0.04 0.18 -0.24 0.814 
LEGISP 2.16** 0.92 2.34 0.020 
EABF 0.13 0.09 1.51 0.134 
Constant -7.50 5.26 -1.42 0.156 
Observations = 171     
R-squared = 0.40     
F (9, 161) = 13.38     
Prob>F = 0.0000     
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Returning to the Model 2 results estimated from the FE model, while the coefficient on 
business interests is in the expected, negative, direction, the coefficient on the interaction term 
(CO2EM*BUSINT) is positive suggesting that business interests have an invigorating influence 
on the marginal effect of pollution and appropriations.  Since the coefficient on 
(CO2EM*BUSINT) is positive, this suggests that there is no reductive effect by business 
interests—unlike the findings from Model 1.  To better visualize the impact of CO2 emissions on 
appropriations along the range of business interests, multiple marginal effects points were 
calculated to create a graph using business interests values ranging between 0.01 and 0.41—the 
minimum and maximum values—calculated in increments of 0.02.  Figure 17 provides a graph 
wherein the solid sloping line reflects how the marginal effect of CO2 emissions on 





Figure 17.   
Marginal Effects of Increased Business Interests on CO2 Pollution and Appropriations from Fees 
& Other Sources (Model 2) 
 
The confidence intervals depicted by the bands illustrate the absence of an interaction of 
business interests on CO2 emissions.  The coefficient on the interaction term does not reach 
statistical significance at the 0.05 significance level at any level of business interests within the 
range of possible values.  Contrasting with the evidence from Model 1—that criteria pollutant 
emissions elicit positive fiscal responsiveness as long as business interests are sufficiently low—
it appears CO2 emissions have a dissimilar effect.  Since inclusion of CO2 emissions into the 
conceptual model, while informed by ecological citizenship theory, was largely exploratory in 
nature, these results are still intriguing.  The results suggest that while states are appropriating 
more funds to address criteria air pollution, GHG emissions are not yet producing a similar 



























business interests are having a reductive effect on the relationship between pollution and 
appropriations.  Similar to Model 1, these unexpected findings with respect to the Model 2 
results could be explained by the duration of time it takes for budgetary determinants to diffuse 
through the budgeting process especially for CO2 emissions which are still not regulated by 
many states.  While roughly half of the states do have mandatory emissions requirements for 
CO2, based on the dataset used in this analysis, the other half of the country does not regulate 
CO2 emissions.  Arguably, it is when states have mandatory regulations that the budgetary 
drivers exist to fund the necessary compliance, permitting, and enforcement apparatus to 
implement the control and abatement policies.  More on the implications of this finding is 
offered in the final chapter.       
4.4.3. Model 3. Criteria air pollution & general funds. 
 A foundational assumption of this study is that appropriations from fees and other 
sources and appropriations drawn from general funds are independently determined.  Models 3 
and 4 are estimated to test the same hypotheses using appropriations from state general funds.  
To review, general fund appropriations to state environmental agencies are a comparatively 
minor component of overall environmental financial resources—representing roughly 20% of the 
total available dollars for environmental protection.  Estimating separate models using general 
funds allows me to explore the differential influences, if any, of the regressors on these two 
sources of appropriations.  
Results from the Wooldridge test for serial correlation, and the results for the Breusch-
Pagan test both indicated the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the model to 
be accommodated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  Unlike Models 1 and 2, 





would be preferred to run a RE model or a pooled-OLS regression, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier (LM test) is performed.  The null hypothesis for the LM test is that variation across the 
states is zero (i.e. there is no effect on appropriations due to differences across the states) 
(Breusch & Pagan, 1980).  The results of the LM test were statistically significant indicating 
random effects in the panel data, thus a preference for selecting a RE model over pooled OLS as 
the estimation method.   
There are several essential differences between FE and RE models that merit a brief 
discussion.  First, where the FE model employs within-effects estimation as the method—and the 
F-statistic for the hypothesis test—the RE model uses generalized least squares (GLS) and the 
Chi-squared statistic to test model significance.  Also, while the average random effects across 
individual units (e.g. states in this study) are fixed (i.e. controlled out) in the FE model, a RE 
model does not control out any time invariant heterogeneity across the groups.  Per Greene 
(2008), when there is a random effect within the dataset that is correlated with the regressors (i.e. 
budgetary determinants), then the RE model can produce inconsistent results.  Since the null of 
the Hausman test was not rejected, however, it is assumed that any individual random effects 
(i.e. from any unmeasured or omitted variables) are uncorrelated with the values of regressors in 
the model, indicating the preference for a RE model (Kennedy, 2008).   
The results of the RE regression of Model 3 are listed in Table 21.  Overall, the model is 
statistically significant (Wald chi-square < 0.001).  With the exception of CIVENV, the signs on 
all coefficients are in the expected direction.  Hypothesis 6 predicting state fiscal capacity will 
have a positive influence on environmental agency budgets is supported at the 0.05 significance 
level (p = 0.04).  This finding suggests that an increase in the revenue generating potential of 





states have more revenue generating potential, it can be expected that they will appropriate more 
for environmental protection compared to when they have less capacity to raise such revenues.  
Notably, the influence of fiscal capacity on appropriations from fees and other sources was not 
significant suggesting a differential influence of this fiscal factor on environmental agency 
budgets.   
The coefficient on the focal independent variable in the model, CAPSIDX, is positive—
and statistically significant—suggesting that as criteria pollutant emissions increase, there is a 
positive influence on appropriations.  These results are similar to the Model 1 results which 
reaffirms criteria air pollution positively influence appropriations regardless of the source (i.e. 
the effect is consistent across state own-source funding streams).  Again, since the main effect of 
criteria air pollution is not specifically being tested, and it is describing the influence of pollution 
on appropriations in complete absence of business interests, the conditional marginal effect of 
pollution on appropriations is separately examined.   
No other coefficients on the regression terms are statistically significant at either the 0.10, 
or the 0.05 significance level.  From Model 3, there is insufficient evidence that partisan 
ideology, civic environmentalism, climate policies—which were not dropped from the FE 
models, or legislative professionalization have a significant, direct, influence (i.e. main effect) on 
appropriations from general funds.  In regards to the control variable—federal-source 
appropriations to environmental agencies—similar to Models 1 and 2, this variable does not 








Table 21. Random-effects Estimates for Appropriations from General Funds (Criteria Air 





CAPSIDX 0.20* 0.11 1.81 0.070 
FISCAP 0.42** 0.20 2.10 0.035 
PARTID 1.00 0.62 1.60 0.110 
BUSINT -1.74 1.74 -1.00 0.315 
CAPSIDX * BUSINT -1.00** 0.44 -2.27 0.023 
CLMTP 0.35 0.41 0.85 0.393 
CIVENV -0.08 0.078 -0.98 0.327 
LEGISP 0.39 1.58 0.25 0.806 
EABF 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.993 
Constant -2.40 2.41 -1.00 0.318 
Observations = 171     
Groups (States) = 47     
R-squared (overall) = 0.34     
R-squared (within) = 0.04     
R-squared (between) = 0.40      
Wald χ2 (9) = 52.73     
Prob> χ2 = <0.001     
rho = 0.89     
Fixed year effects; Independent variables are lagged 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
While the coefficient on the interaction term (CAPSIDX*BUSINT) provides evidence of 
statistically significant—and negative—interaction of business interests and criteria air pollution 
on agency appropriations from general funds, this coefficient is not directly interpretable—
similar to Model 1.  Since the coefficient on (CAPSIDX*BUSINT) is negative, this suggests that 
the reductive effect increases as the prevalence of business interests increases.  To better 
visualize the impact of criteria air pollution on appropriations along the business interests 
continuum,  multiple marginal effects points were calculated to create a graph using business 
interests values ranging between 0.01 and 0.41—the minimum and maximum values—calculated 





marginal effect of criteria air pollution on appropriations is impacted by business interest 
conditions.   
Figure 18.   
Marginal Effects of Increased Business Interests on Criteria Air Pollution and Appropriations 
from General Funds (Model 3) 
 
Similar to Model 1, when the marginal effect of criteria air pollution on appropriations 
from general funds is viewed across a range of business interests found among the states, the 
negative interaction effect of business interests becomes clear.  As shown in Figure 18, the 
results from Model 3; however, provide limited evidence of increased environmental budgets 
from general funds compared to appropriations from fees and other sources.  More specifically, 
as Table 18 reveals, while Model 1 found significant interaction at the lowest possible level of 
business interests through approximately 0.18, the points at which the interaction of business 





at only the 0.10 significance level.  Moreover, at higher levels of business interests, the reductive 
effect of business interests on appropriations in response to criteria air pollution eventually 
vanishes in Model 1 while, in Model 3, the negative interaction effect remains within the 
confidence intervals.  When considered in the context of the business interest values across the 
sample population, just under 10% of business interest values throughout the states fell within 
this region of significance.   
Unlike with appropriations derived from fees and other sources, the marginal effect of 
pollution on appropriations from general funds is negative, and statistically significant, at high 
levels of business interests (i.e. towards the right of Figure 18).  That is, as criteria pollutants 
become more severe, this is having a negative influence on general funds at high levels of 
business interests.  This finding suggests there is not only a lack of fiscal responsiveness, from 
general funds, among states in response to increasing criteria air pollution but a negative fiscal 
responsiveness when business interests are very high (i.e. states are spending less in response to 
pollution).   
To review, in Model 1 and Model 3, there is evidence of interaction between business 
interests and criteria air pollution on appropriations from both sources.  However, somewhat 
inconsistent between appropriations from fees and other sources (Model 1) and general funds 
(Model 3) is the relative lack of positive fiscal responsiveness to pollution across a large 
continuum of business interests in the latter model (i.e. Model 3).  Additionally, there is evidence 
of a negative fiscal responsiveness to pollution at very high levels of business interests in Model 
3.  Unlike in Model 1 where the interaction effect of business interests and criteria air pollution is 





criteria air pollution is largely absent in Model 3 (the interaction is observable but only at the 
very lowest level of business interests).     
The results of Model 3 provide support for Hypothesis 1 regarding the role of high levels 
of business interests in deterring funding from general funds in response to criteria air pollution.  
However, the results are not fully consistent with expectations of greater fiscal responsiveness at 
low business interest conditions such as those revealed in Model 1.  Taken together, the 
intriguing findings from Model 3 suggest that moderation by business interests on pollution and 
appropriations does depend, to some degree, on the source of appropriations which will be 
further discussed below.   
  Table 22 provides the marginal effects of the criteria air pollution on appropriations 
from fees and other sources at varying levels (i.e. percentiles) of business interests and reveals 
that the interaction of business interests and pollution is statistically significant at both the lowest 
and highest values. 








1% 0.046918 2.83 0.093 0.015551 
5% 0.073185 2.49 0.115 0.012925 
10% 0.083878 2.32 0.128 0.011856 
25% 0.123188 1.57 0.210 0.007927 
50% 0.157073 0.76 0.382 0.004541 
75% 0.208116 0.02 0.881 -0.000561 
90% 0.265409 2.55 0.111 -0.006288 
95% 0.311202 4.84 0.028 -0.010865 
Note. The marginal effect = coefficient of CAPSIDX*unit change of CAPSIDX+coefficient of the interaction 





Based on Table 22, the statistically significant marginal effect of pollution on 
appropriations is absent across the continuum of business interests with the exception of very 
high levels where the marginal effect is negative—as indicated by the negative sign.  For 
example, for a state that falls in approximately the ninety-fifth percentile of BUSINT (0.311202), 
the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase of BUSINT on General Funds is 
0.1*0.2024-0.9995*0.1*0.311202 = -0.011 million dollars, or just above $10,000.  Further, while 
there is a detectable positive marginal effect between pollution and general funds, this marginal 
effect declines as business interests increase eventually phasing-out completely when business 
interests are most prevalent.  However, at the highest levels of business interests, there is 
evidence of a negative fiscal responsiveness to criteria air pollution.  
Though the magnitude of the conditional marginal effect is not particularly strong, the 
results presented in Figure 18 and Tables 21 and 22 provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.  
Criteria air pollution does tend to increase environmental agency budgets across the states but 
this positive marginal effect is evidenced only at the very lowest levels of business interests (i.e. 
only a few cases within the dataset).  What is also revealed from these results, however, is the 
reductive effect of business interests eventually leading to negative fiscal responsiveness to 
criteria air pollution at very high levels of business interests.   
4.4.4. Model 4. CO2 emissions & general funds. 
The results from the Wooldridge test and the Breusch-Pagan test provided evidence of 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, respectively and will be accommodated using 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Stock & Watson, 2003).  Similar to Model 3 which 





suggests a RE model is preferred.  The results of the RE regression of Model 4 are provided in 
Table 23.   
Overall, the model is statistically significant (Wald chi-square < 0.001).  With the 
exception of CIVENV, the signs on all coefficients are in the expected direction which is 
dissimilar to Model 2—which also included CO2 emissions as the focal predictor; in that model 
several of the coefficients were not in there expected direction.  Hypothesis 6 predicts state fiscal 
capacity will have a positive influence on environmental agency budgets is supported at the 0.10 
significance level (p = 0.08).  This finding reinforces the finding from Model 3 and further 
suggests that an increase in the revenue generating potential of states (i.e. fiscal capacity) leads 
to an increase in appropriations from the general fund regardless of the other budgetary 
predictors.  Again, the influence of fiscal capacity on appropriations from fees and other sources 
was not significant suggesting a differential influence of this fiscal factor on environmental 
agency budgets.  Compared to the Model 1 and Model 3 results, which suggest criteria air 
pollution tends to positively influence the appropriations derived from fees and other sources in 
accommodative business interests conditions, again, no such influence emerges with GHG 
emissions.  The conditional marginal effect of pollution on appropriations is separately 
examined.   
No other coefficients on the regression terms are statistically significant at either the 0.10, 
or the 0.05 significance level (p < 0.1, p < 0.05).  From this model, there is insufficient evidence 
that partisan ideology, civic environmentalism, climate policies, or legislative professionalization 
have a significant, direct, influence (i.e. main effect) on appropriations from general funds.  In 
regards to the control variable—federal-source appropriations to environmental agencies—











CO2EM 0.15 0.23 0.63 0.528 
FISCAP 0.43* 0.24 1.76 0.078 
PARTID 0.77 0.65 1.17 0.241 
BUSINT 26.85 23.43 1.15 0.252 
CO2EM * BUSINT -1.11 0.95 -1.17 0.240 
CLMTP 0.34 0.41 0.84 0.402 
CIVENV -0.10 0.09 -1.12 0.262 
LEGISP 1.10 1.81 0.61 0.543 
EABF 0.01 0.05 0.17 0.862 
Constant -6.35 4.61 -1.38 0.168 
Observations = 171     
Groups (States) = 47     
R-squared (overall) = 0.31     
R-squared (within) = 0.01     
R-squared (between) = 0.34       
Wald χ2 (9) = 35.30     
Prob> χ2 = <0.001     
rho = 0.87     
Fixed year effects; Independent variables are lagged 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
To visualize the dynamics of the interaction effect of business interests on CO2 
emissions, multiple marginal effects points were calculated to create a graph using business 
interests values ranging between 0.01 and 0.41—the minimum and maximum values—calculated 
in increments of 0.02.  Figure 19 provides a graph wherein the solid sloping line reflects how the 
marginal effect of CO2 emissions on appropriations is not conditional upon business interest 







Figure 19.   
Marginal Effects of Increased Business Interests and CO2 Pollution on Appropriations from 
General Funds (Model 4) 
 
The confidence intervals depicted by the bands illustrate the absence of an interaction of 
business interests on CO2 emissions.  The coefficient on the interaction term does not reach 
statistical significance at either the 0.05, or 0.1 significance levels at any level of business 
interests within the range of possible values.  Considered together with the evidence from Model 
2, CO2 emissions do not elicit positive fiscal responsiveness from states at any level of business 
interests regardless of the source of appropriations.  The results from Model 4 regarding the lack 
of support for Hypothesis 1 (i.e. an interaction effect) reinforce the notion that while states are 
appropriating more funds to address so-called criteria air pollution problems, GHG emissions are 
not yet producing a similar marginal effect on environmental budgets.  Further, also consistent 



























relationship between pollution and appropriations.  Similar to the lack of significance for 
budgetary predictors among the other models, these findings could be explained by a longer lag 
than included in the current analysis which was only one year given the rather short panel of the 
five-year dataset.   
It is generally accepted in public policy that there is a duration of time it takes for 
budgetary determinants to diffuse through the budgeting process which may be especially true 
for CO2 emissions which are still not regulated by many states.  While roughly half of the states 
do have mandatory emissions requirements for CO2, based on the dataset used in this analysis, 
the other half of the country does not regulate CO2 emissions through a regime of mandatory 
state-level requirements.  Arguably, it is when states have mandatory regulations that the 
budgetary drivers exist to fund the necessary compliance, permitting, and enforcement apparatus 
to implement the control and abatement policies.   
The results presented here provide a portrait of contemporary environmental governance 
consistent with expectations in certain respects (i.e. political, legal, and fiscal factors do 
influence appropriations) and contrary in other respects.  When the empirical results are taken 
together, this dissertation adds to this strand of the public budgeting and environmental policy 
scholarship telling a story that aligns with the previous scholarship while offering theoretical and 
methodological contributions that hold promise for future avenues of research.  Further 
interpretation of the findings revealed in the empirical results, including a comparison to findings 








Chapter 5: Conclusion 
As the arc of fiscal federalism in US environmental governance curves increasingly 
towards budgetary decentralization, states appear to be filling an ever-expanding budgetary void.  
A key purpose of this dissertation is to build knowledge and further understand the extent to 
which state own-source funding of environmental agency budgets is influenced by the political, 
institutional, legal, and fiscal factors informed by theory and previous scholarship.   
The first section of this concluding chapter summarizes and reviews the empirical results 
regarding the effects of the political, institutional, legal, and fiscal factors on state own-source 
funding to environmental agencies with particular focus on the important interaction by business 
interests.  The second and third sections provide the main conclusions followed by practical 
implications while the fourth section provides the research contributions of the dissertation 
before concluding with several avenues for future research.   
Air pollution—a focal variable in this dissertation—represents an environmental problem 
which continues to “put pressure on state policymakers to generate policy responses” (Kim and 
Verweij, 2016, p. 509), and perhaps nowhere more is this evident than at the state-level (Mikos, 
2007; Shaw & Reinhart, 2001).  In addition to the political importance of air quality as a primary 
issue on the environmental agenda in the US (Rosenbaum, 2017), business interests are 
influential by “securing differential gains by political means” (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999, p. 
206).  Moreover, research from across the disciplines, including political science and 
environmental policy, reveals other factors to consider when examining variation in 
environmental budget policy (Aidt, 1998; Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Basu & Devaraj, 2014; Coan & 





crucial given the results that occur when state environmental agencies encounter downward 
fiscal pressures.   
Without adequate financial resources, agency capacity to perform delegated duties is 
hollowed-out; there are lapses that then occur due to inadequate compliance and enforcement 
oversight with consequent impacts on public health (ECOS, 2017a; 2018; Environmental 
Integrity Project, 2019; National Association of Clean Air Agencies, 2017; Steinzor, 2006; 
Woods et al., 2008).  Setting environmental budget policy commensurate with environmental 
challenges might not prove sufficient to guarantee robust environmental governance; however, 
inadequate appropriations appear sufficient to preclude it as a reasonable possibility.   
The analysis offered by this dissertation is driven by a perspective that does not view 
budget policy formulation as the end result of a linear progression of stages such as those offered 
by policy heuristics (Easton, 1965; Lasswell, 1956; Ripley, 1985).  Instead, public budgeting 
plays-out against a backdrop of conditions that must be considered in determining when policies 
are either implemented, or not, and why governmental institutions take certain policy approaches 
rather than others.  It is through this public budgeting lens that the following research questions 
are asked:    
Research Question 1: Does the influence of air pollution on state environmental appropriations 
vary according to the magnitude of polluting business interests? 
Research Question 2: What are the effects of political, institutional, fiscal, and legal factors on 
state own-source appropriations to state environmental agencies and do the effects vary based on 
the funding source or air pollutant type? 
To address the research questions, a theoretical framework and conceptual model is 





arguably ought to characterize environmental policy in the US (Bingham et al., 2005; Fischer & 
Forester, 1993).  The integrated theory of state policymaking framework is applied to summarize 
the crucial factors that explain state environmental policy from a broad perspective, and 
technocracy, rational self-interest, and ecological citizenship theories are drawn upon to 
establish the logical associations between budgetary determinants and agency appropriations in 
the empirical models.  Related to the empirical features of the study, econometric models are 
used with an unbalanced panel design, and independent variable data from 2010 to 2014 was 
matched to data on state environmental agency appropriations from 2011 to 2015.   
This study helps address the empirical gaps and answers the call for a theoretical-based 
analysis of state environmental agency funding to enhance knowledge for policy makers 
involved with state environmental agency budget policy.  Appropriating environmental agency 
funds amid multiple political and policy factors that influence the decision-making process is a 
reality for public policymakers.  Of practical importance is which of these factors help explain 
varying levels of general fund and fee appropriations among the states given the myriad 
characteristics revealed by previous research.   
5.1. Summary & Review of Key Findings 
While a limited number of the factors examined proved to be influential determinants of 
environmental appropriations, several meaningful findings do emerge.  Table 24 offers a 
summary of whether the empirical evidence did, or did not, provide support for each of the six 








Table 24. Summary of Findings by Pollution Type and Revenue Source 
Hypothesis & Key Variable Pollution Type 
Fees & Other 
Sources 
General Funds 
Hypothesis 1  
Business Interests Interaction 
Criteria Air Pollution Y Y 
CO2 Emissions N N 
Hypothesis 2 
Civic Environmentalism 
Criteria Air Pollution N N 
CO2 Emissions N N 
Hypothesis 3 
Mandatory Climate Policies 
Criteria Air Pollution Y N 
CO2 Emissions N N 
Hypothesis 4 
Legislative Professionalization 
Criteria Air Pollution N N 
CO2 Emissions N N 
Hypothesis 5  
Partisan Ideology 
Criteria Air Pollution N N 
CO2 Emissions N N 
Hypothesis 6 
State Fiscal Capacity 
Criteria Air Pollution N Y 
CO2 Emissions N Y 
 
The empirical results provide support for three of the six hypotheses.  There are six 
findings.  First, criteria air pollution has a positive marginal effect on state environmental agency 
appropriations when business interest conditions range from low to slightly above the mid-range 
values.  This finding suggests states do increase appropriations in response to air pollution 
problems when business interest conditions are sufficiently accommodative.  Second, this pattern 
of fiscal responsiveness to criteria air pollution is evidenced for appropriations from fees and 
other sources and general funds reinforcing support for Hypothesis 1, albeit the influence on 
general funds is characterized by a less pronounced conditional marginal effect.  Further, in the 
case of general funds, the reductive effect of business interests is such that appropriations 
towards addressing criteria air pollution turn negative (i.e. funding decreases) at very high levels 
of business interests.  The conclusions to be drawn from the interaction effects by business 





Third, when standard regression was used to estimate Model 1, there was support for 
Hypothesis 3 (i.e. that mandatory climate policies have a positive influence on environmental 
appropriations).  Fourth, fiscal responsiveness to air pollutants is limited to criteria air pollution 
and does not extend to addressing CO2 emissions, and this finding holds for both revenue sources 
of appropriations.  Fifth, the capacity among states to raise revenue does matter in relation to 
budgetary responsiveness to pollution, and this direct effect of fiscal capacity holds across both 
measures of pollution but only for general funds (i.e. Models 3 and 4) providing support for 
Hypothesis 6.  In other words, the ability for states to raise revenue does not extend to having an 
influence on appropriations from fees and other sources.  Lastly, as modeled in this dissertation, 
civic environmentalism, legislative professionalization, and partisan ideology do not appear to 
influence, positively or negatively, appropriations derived from either source of state own-source 
funding.  In summary, while the empirical results demonstrate support for Hypothesis 1 
(interaction of business interests and pollution); Hypothesis 3 (climate policies); and Hypothesis 
6 (fiscal capacity), there was a lack of empirical support for the remaining hypotheses.   
5.2. Conclusions 
There are several conclusions to draw from the empirical results.  First, my findings 
support prior studies that find environmental pollution influences appropriations (Bacot & 
Dawes, 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012), albeit in a relationship that is perhaps more complex 
than ordinarily presented, thus contributing a different way of thinking about the influence air 
quality has on environmental budgets.  Only one study examined the interaction of business 
interests and pollution on environmental funding (Newmark and Witko, 2007).  Contrary to the 





increase in state environmental budgets in response to pollution diminishes and eventually 
vanishes at high values of business interests.   
Viewed through the lens of rational self-interest theory, business and industrial 
communities appear to exert influence over the budgeting process.  The costs businesses seek to 
reduce include regulatory compliance costs estimated at over $200 billion per year—60 percent 
of which “are borne by corporations seeking to meet their statutory obligations” (Kraft, 2017, p. 
78).  Thus, in support of technocracy theory—and Hypothesis 1—when business interests are 
low, the relationship between criteria air pollution and state budgets is positive.  Moreover, the 
presence of the reductive effect of business interests on criteria air pollution and appropriations 
from general funds was consistent with Hypothesis 1 suggesting an affirmative answer to the 
first research question.   
In the case of general funds, the reductive effects seem to be so strong as to elicit a 
negative fiscal responsiveness to criteria air pollution at very high levels of business interests as 
shown in Model 3.  These findings suggests that when business interests are very high, there is 
an inflection point in the fiscal responsiveness to environmental pollution.  Business interests 
appear to be having a more impactful influence on general funds versus fees and other sources, 
and this conclusion is compatible with previous literature.  For example, in a survey of 
environmental and natural resource agencies, O’Hare (2006) found that general fund 
appropriations are particularly vulnerable to changes based on gubernatorial and legislative 
concerns rather than directly influenced by unelected environmental managers.   
Second, with regard to Hypothesis 2, despite currency in the academic literature and 
theoretical support drawing from ecological citizenship theory, civic environmentalism did not 





society participation in US policymaking, one conclusion that could be drawn is there is a 
democracy and legitimacy deficit in current environmental governance with citizen involvement 
residing at the nexus (Durant et al., 2017; Glucker et al., 2013).  A far less sweeping conclusion 
could relate to the operationalization of civic environmentalism.  More specifically, LCV scores 
are based upon the voting records of the states’ delegations to the federal legislature not to the 
state legislatures themselves.  Accordingly, it could be the lack of significance is attributable to 
the fiscal influence of this variable being limited to federal-source funding rather than being 
operant at the state-level.   
Third, inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, climate policies failed to demonstrate a positive 
relationship with agency budgets derived from general funds in Models 3 and 4.  However, when 
Model 1—which included criteria air pollution—was estimated using standard OLS, climate 
policies were found to have a positive influence on appropriations from fees and other sources.  
Somewhat surprisingly, a similar result was not observed when Model 2—which included CO2 
emissions—was estimated using standard OLS.  Taken together, the results regarding climate 
policies were inconsistent with expectations and somewhat contradictory making it difficult to 
draw any meaningful conclusions for this variable.   
Designing, implementing, and enforcing climate regulations will involve building robust 
programs to include attracting and retaining high-level professional staff all of which will require 
sufficient financial resources, but can state environmental agencies step up to appropriate funds 
for these expanded and more technically complex rolls to address CO2 emissions?  “A frequent 
question that emerges during these periods is whether states are up to the task, and it will come 
as little surprise to scholars of state politics that the answer is that “it depends” (Konisky & 





cost the government more to implement, thus will drive appropriations in the positive direction.  
Due to the time it can take for implemented policies to diffuse and potentially account for 
variance in fiscal policy outputs, it could be that more time is necessary for the fiscal 
requirements—that will be necessitated to stand-up programs to address climate change at the 
state-agency level—to be detectable using a panel design.   
Fourth, regarding Hypothesis 4, again, there was no evidence that legislative 
professionalization had any influence on appropriations.  Similar to civic environmentalism, the 
available literature on this variable is limited and somewhat contradictory.  For example, 
Konisky & Woods (2012) found that greater legislative professionalism led to less environmental 
stringency and had no significant influence on environmental expenditures—a finding consistent 
with Agthe et al. (1996) who found only a linkage between this variable and environmental 
program quality.   
One conclusion regarding the lack of influence of legislative professionalization is state 
legislatures could be unaware of how reliant US environmental governance has become on state 
own-source revenues.  While the devolution of authorities to state governments for 
environmental protection has transpired over several decades, there could be an institutional 
recalcitrance in planning and budgeting additional fiscal resources even as legislative 
professionalization increases across states.  To the extent this holds true, it could be concluded 
this variable, like many of the others, is value-laden and researchers should be careful in 
assuming which precise values this characteristic captures.  That is, it may be unjustified to 
assume professionalism of elected state officials provides a surrogate indication of a granular 
understanding of pollution, or appreciation of the reliance on state own-source funding structures 





Fifth, the finding that Democrat-control versus Republican-control of state political 
institutions (i.e. partisan ideology) did not have an influence on appropriations—inconsistent 
with Hypothesis 5—provides an interesting contradiction to the academic literature that merits 
further discussion.  One alternative explanation rests in party platform considerations.  In their 
study of USEPA budgets, Balint & Conant (2013) explicated the connection between partisan 
ideology and environmental budget policy using a partisan political model.  Applying that 
model, environmental appropriations are positively influenced when the consensus within the 
party (i.e. party platform) is pro-environment.  Conversely, if the priorities of the majority party 
are misaligned with the priorities of the environmental agency, then budget policy is stifled.  
Thus, the relationship between partisan ideology and appropriations could incorporate platform 
considerations rather than only the proportion of state legislature controlled by one or the other 
major political parties.  However, this alternative explanation is weakened by the academic 
scholarship that finds a consistent positive influence of liberal ideology on governmental 
spending, in general (e.g. Dolan, 2002; Ryu et al., 2008) and environmental funding, in particular 
(e.g. Clark & Whitford, 2011; Konisky & Woods, 2012).  Thus, I will now explore two 
additional alternatives that could further explain the lack of a partisan influence.   
Partisan control of state government is a function of control over the executive (i.e. 
governorship) and the legislature.  Additionally, akin to the national government, control over 
state government can be either divided, or unified.  With the measure applied in this dissertation 
(i.e. the Ranney Index) the effects that a unified versus divided government power dynamic 
might have on environmental appropriations were not estimated by the models.  For example, 
Fowler and Breen (2013) observed that unified government can stifle legislative passage.  To the 





appropriations despite greater Democrat-control, this influence was left unexamined.  Lastly, the 
academic literature finds that a Governor’s budget recommendations are particularly influential 
on state agency budgets as explained by the chief executive office’s influence on agency budget 
requests (Sharkansky, 1968; Ryu et al., 2008).  Again, with the political variables specified in the 
conceptual and empirical models of this dissertation, such an influence went unincorporated.  
Taken together, the contradictory finding regarding partisan ideology underscores the need to 
exercise caution in specifying empirical models, with numerous political variables, in order to 
capture the wide spectrum of political influences on the budgeting process.    
Sixth, Willoughby and Finn (1996) observed spending preferences of state policy analysts 
were often predicated on the long-term fiscal health which was translated to their budgetary 
recommendations relative to other factors.  That is, public budgets are reflective of decisions 
made by state-level public managers based on their understanding of the financial soundness of 
public sector institutions and the government as-a-whole.  Consistent with this, and other, 
academic literature, there was partial-support for Hypothesis 6.  That is, findings suggested that 
where states had greater revenue-generating potential, general fund appropriations were higher.  
One conclusion is that while budget officials may be considering revenue generating capacity 
when setting appropriations from the general fund, the same focus does not extend to revenues 
from fees and other sources.  It might be concluded that the fee and other source revenues are 
being set internally by the agency public managers versus by elected officials; this remains a 
speculative assertion, however, and would require further research to reveal whether such 
dynamics are at play.  As it relates to the background literature, the positive influence of fiscal 





should be noted many of those studies did not detect statistically significant results (Bacot & 
Dawes, 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012; Newmark & Witko, 2007).   
Lastly, federal-source funding to state environmental agencies was retained in all models 
to control for its effects given the anticipated influence federal funding was thought to have on 
state own-source appropriations.  Given previous research revealing a fly-paper effect between 
intergovernmental revenue sources (Clark & Whitford, 2011), federal-source funds were 
expected to be associated positively with both sources of state-source funding.  Contrary to 
expectations, this influence was not supported by the empirical results suggesting a fiscal 
disconnect between these intergovernmental budgetary sources to environmental agencies.   
While federal-source appropriations are included as a control, it could also be concluded the lack 
of significant results from across all four models simply reflects the minute share federal-source 
appropriations contribute to state environmental budgets.   
5.3. Practical Implications  
Three policy implications are informed from the above findings and conclusions.  First, 
previous academic research over several decades finds that business interests in the US are not 
idle by-standers in the public policy process (Davies & Davies, 1975; Dell, 2009; Hays et al., 
1996; Moore & Giovinazzo, 2011).  Normatively, environmental governance is financially 
responsive to pollution problems; however, evidence is herein offered that business interests are 
neutralizing the effects of air pollutants on environmental agency budgets given the negative 
interaction effect of business interests.   
That is, when business interests are low, and in response to criteria air pollution, states 
appear to internalize the governance costs related to environmental protection functions through 





increasingly reliant on these revenue structures to promote environmental governance at the state 
level.  The practical implication here is that business interests negatively moderate the 
relationship between air quality and appropriations signaling an opportunity for public managers 
and elected officials to promote civic engagement and cultivate a plurality of interests in the 
budgeting process.    
Second—and related to the first implication—business interests have a differential 
conditional marginal effect on the budgeting process as it relates to fees and other sources 
compared to general funds.  More specifically, a negative conditional marginal effect was 
observed for general funds but not for fees and other sources.  The practical implication of this 
finding is that resourcing state environmental agencies through fees and other sources may be 
more politically-insulated than the appropriations derived from general funds.  For public 
budgeters involved in analyzing and setting budget policy for environmental agencies, this 
suggests focusing on raising revenues from these fees may be a more viable alternative compared 
to making policy recommendations aimed at securing increasing appropriations from general 
funds.   
Third, while appropriations bills are ultimately voted-on by elected officials, the content 
of budget proposals is a function of a host of stakeholders, many of whom are unelected, who per 
technocracy theory do understand air pollutants.  In other words, line agency managers must vie 
for limited resources by making arguments to public budgeters—including elected officials—
supported by empirical data.  These arguments and lines-of-evidence in the budget proposals are 
reviewed by budget office analysts and by executive and legislative branch officials.  As the 
public budgeting scholar Irene Rubin (2010) pointed-out, to be successful, these proposals must 





The lack of statistical significance across the models in this study for the majority of the 
political, institutional, and legal factors could reflect a state of environmental governance 
whereby the fiscal needs are being conveyed but are simply getting lost in the milieu of 
competing needs facing state governments across the US.  To the extent a knowledge deficit does 
exist, the environmental agency officials might examine how their knowledge of air quality 
conditions is, or is not, being brokered with elected officials including the differences between 
criteria pollutant and carbon emissions, and the immediacy with which appropriations should 
increase. 
5.4. Research Contributions  
As noted in Chapter 1, a review of the literature reveals an opportunity for improving 
theoretical coherence, applying distinctive methodological strategies including various measures 
of air pollution to advance this branch of public budgeting and environmental policy research.  It 
is with these considerations and perspectives that his dissertation offers four contributions.     
First, the integrated theory of state policymaking presents a policymaking framework that 
state policy responsiveness can be accounted for by influences from interests groups; political 
ideological dispositions; ambient environmental conditions; and economic conditions.  Despite 
the explanatory role this framework has lent to state environmental administration scholarship, it 
has not been used to explain state environmental agency budget policy to-date.  This dissertation 
suggests its utility for future similar studies.   
Second, despite prior research suggesting federal and state policy, within the same 
functional areas of governance, have notable differences in terms of their antecedents (Clark & 
Whitford, 2011), the environmental budgets are often represented by total fiscal resources, or 





(Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Konisky & Woods, 2012).  As Figure 15 reveals, however, state 
governments have increasingly relied upon general funds and user charges drawn from the 
regulated community—the two sources of state own-source funding.  This dissertation 
contributes to the scholarly conversation by examining general fund appropriations separate from 
fees and other sources to assess the differential influence of budgetary determinants on a revenue 
structure upon which states are growing increasingly reliant—fees and other sources.  The results 
suggest the two behave similarly, but not identically—(e.g. climate policies and fiscal 
capacity)—which holds implications for researchers, and public budgeters alike. 
Third, while this dissertation seeks to explain budgeting of state environmental agencies 
through empirical modeling, it is generally understood that not all variables “operate in the same 
fashion” (Howell, et al., 1986, p. 88).  The design of the study attends to the concerns of state 
environmental policy scholars to move beyond analyzing bivariate relationships and regression 
coefficients interpreted by focusing only on direct effects (Lester & Lombard, 1990).  This 
dissertation contributes to the research by emphasizing the interaction effect of business interests 
on environmental pollution and appropriations.   
  Fourth, while pollutant emissions from criteria pollutants and CO2 are formed from 
similar processes (e.g. fuel combustion, industrial operations), the empirical analysis of the fiscal 
responsiveness to their mitigation should take into account the differential influence that criteria 
air pollution and GHG emissions have on appropriations.  The results reveal a lack of fiscal 
responsiveness to what is arguably the cause of the most pressing environmental challenge of our 
day—global climate change due to anthropogenic GHG emissions, particularly CO2.  While 
environmental agencies are fiscally responsive to criteria pollutants, the pivot has perhaps yet to 





5.5. Areas for Future Research 
This study is built upon a framework that considers the interdependencies between 
pollution and budget policy at the state level to help advance research agendas in this strand of 
public budgeting scholarship.  This dissertation concludes with four areas for future research.   
First, a future study could involve interviewing environmental agency managers using a 
deductive coding scheme drawing from the theoretical framework and additional theories of this 
dissertation to identify key themes related to knowledge brokering by environmental agencies in 
the context of appropriations requests.  This thematic analysis would be combined with content 
analysis of state budget documents to identify any systematic approaches used to convey an 
empirical understanding of air pollutant emissions to budget analysts, legislative staff, 
legislators, and other stakeholders.  Such a study could provide added context to the findings by 
exploring the relationships implicit in the focal relationship of this article--the linkage public 
managers putatively make between pollution problems and agency budgets.   
Second, while included in this dissertation to control for its effects on state own-source 
funding, federal-source funding is declining.  Future studies could focus on the unique budgetary 
predictors of federal-source revenues to state environmental agencies building on previous 
research and extending into interviews with public budgeters at the USEPA regions and their 
counterparts at the state-level.  Such studies could yield insights into what factors have 
constrained federal-source funding over the years and how, perhaps, offer paths to stem this 
fiscal decline.   
Third, with respect to partisan ideology, a future study could examine the interaction of 
partisan ideology and pollution on budgets at partisan ideological levels including Republican-





interaction model with two moderators—business interests and partisan ideology.  In such a 
study, the models would depict the marginal effects of increasing air pollutants on environmental 
across the entire span of partisan ideology levels and varying levels of business interests ranging 
from very low to very high.  For example, the marginal effects of increased Democratic control 
in state government would be calculated across values of increasing pollutant severity to assess, 
if environmental appropriations—from either general funds, or fees and other sources—decrease, 
or increase, based upon partisan control of state legislatures.  Such a study could provide 
evidence as to what marginal effect partisan ideology has when business interests levels are 
accommodative (i.e. low) versus in high business interests conditions.   
Lastly, resource dependence theory holds that organizations have dependencies with their 
external environments and that institutions will develop linkages to external elements so as to 
stabilize, or even gain resources, and reduce environmental uncertainty (Hillman, Shropshire, 
Cannella, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  This theory helps explain why state environmental 
agencies obtain increased autonomy and control of environmental programs by requesting 
authorization and programmatic delegation from the USEPA (Crotty, 1987).  A line of future 
research could, thus, involve examining the declining reliance on federal-source revenues viewed 
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